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Introduction
The essays composing this dissertation are three independent works,
grouped by a common perspective: a policy point of view of educa-
tional issues. All the three studies relate to socio-educational situations
in which, in some way, people select into. This research attempts to
understand whether the socio-educational input and output considered
are causally related. Chapter 1 investigates the relationship between resi-
dence in public housing and educational achievement. Chapter 2 explores
the role of the ethnic class composition on pupils’ test scores. Chapter 3
is an evaluation of a policy sponsoring scientific faculties.
The first Chapter originates from the evidence of the low school
achievement of children living in public housing, even after controlling
for important determinants of schooling. These kids may perform badly
only because of their disadvantaged family background or because some
projects may represent a deleterious ghetto environment in which school
attitudes can be poorly developed. The aims of this paper are twofold:
one is to verify the existence of a “ghetto” peer effect, the other is to
verify the existence of an increasing “ghetto” effect (in the size of the
project) and/or the existence of an amenity effect (high-rise projects).
The first aim is an extension of the US literature about this topic to the
Italian case, in a non-randomized “moving out” experiment. Although
the evaluation of randomized experiments is more reliable than field stud-
ies, the volunteering participation to this kind of programs may limit the
external validity of the results. Moreover, the effect of living in public
housing may be long-standing and it may be difficult to disentangle the
effect of “moving out” from moving itself, in the short run. The second
point aims at verifying whether there exists an heterogeneous “ghetto”
effect within projects. We exploit the history of the Italian inter-regional
migration and the size of the projects as our identification strategies.
The analysis suggests an unfavorable causal effect of public housing on
school evasion for girls. It also seems that the effect on grade repetition
is stronger the higher the number of units in the project, especially for
girls living in big cities. For other educational outcomes the difficulty to
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isolate the family background effect does not allow us to draw conclusive
comments.
The second Chapter explores the issues of ethnic diversity in the con-
text of schools. Ethnic diversity can stimulate the creativity of students,
can push them to be proficient in the instructional language and culture,
can reduce the scope of ethnic identification with all its possible draw-
backs, but it may also make the job of teachers more difficult. The liter-
ature on the economics of education has mainly investigated the effect of
the ethnic share on school achievement: this study looks at how diverse
is the ethnic minority share and its socio-educational consequences. The
contribution of this paper is to investigate whether ethnic diversity has
an impact on the test scores of children, applying a concept introduced
by the macro and political economy literature and by experimental stud-
ies about the firm’s performance. We also investigate for whom diversity
matters and shed some light on the mechanisms there can be behind.
We exploit the within school time variation in ethnic diversity of a rich
data-set about primary education in the Netherlands as our identifica-
tion strategy. We find that ethnic diversity has a positive impact on the
test scores of minority students, especially for language skills and older
students. We also find a negative relationship between ethnic diversity
and school’s social environment, that can partly explain the gains in test
scores as a results of a more competitive environment.
The third Chapter is about the topic of policy intervention in the field
of college studies, in a context of declining enrolments in scientific tracks.
Policy can intervene in the choice of college major by helping students in
forming their expectations about earnings associated with these majors
and by stimulating their interest in scientific subjects. In 2005, Italy
launched an important promotion policy to boost enrolments in selected
scientific bachelors, providing various activities to high school students.
The aim of this study is to evaluate the efficacy of this policy. Moreover,
following the suggestion of the literature on the choice of college major
about the differential behaviour of male and female, we check whether
the policy has been effective for both male and female. Finally, we check
whether the program generates effects outside the scope of the policy. It
happened that within the same school some students participated to the
program, while others did not. Besides, in order to avoid the problem of
self-selectivity of individuals and classes into the program, we adopt an
“exposure” approach in which we define as treated all students of a co-
hort within a school that were eligible for these activities. We match the
records of the students enrolled in two big universities with the records
of the participating schools. The results show a positive and significant
effect of the policy “Progetto Lauree Scientifiche” on targeted and non
12
targeted scientific bachelors and positive cross treatment effects across
subjects. However, if the policy has a considerable impact on the bach-
elor’s choice for males, it does not appear to have any effect for females.
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Chapter 1
Poor schooling of kids living
in Italian public housing:
ghetto effect?
1.1 Introduction
In Italy since 1903, public housing have been offered to workers and needy
people. This policy originated as a workers’ achievement, but it slowly
and steadily changed into a government policy to cushion emergency
situations. Already during the Fascism the politics of public housing
started to be narrowed and restricted to emergency situations, with a
clear segregation motive. Afterward, the huge demolition of buildings
during war years led to an expansion of the public housing policy (Delera,
2005) (Wendt, 1962). In the 1960s, the economic boom driven by the
urban areas of the North attracted laborers from the South, from the
countryside and from the poor regions of the North1. From 1951 to 1971,
with a peak between 1955 and 1963, about ten millions Italians were
involved in interregional migrations, among them 4.2 out of 18 millions
Southerns migrated to the North. Besides, 550000 Italians emigrated in
Northern Europe, out of which 3/4 were from South Italy. Just to give
an example, the urban population of a North industrial city like Turin
increased by 56% from 1951 to 1967 due to the major migration from
the South and partly from its poor regional countryside (Necco, 2004).
Once again, housing shortage was a problem that governments tried to
solve with a rapid construction of public developments. Suburbs and
then the (yet isolated) areas surrounding the big industrial cities in the
North started to host the new projects (Delera, 2005; Irer, 2004).
1Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia.
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Notwithstanding the effort, the State never succeeded to fully meet
the size of the demand for affordable housing. Moreover, by the second
half of the 1980s the public agencies charged to manage the construction
and maintenance of the projects had accumulated a huge debt. They
were thus forced to sell a considerable part of their housing stock and
to stop the maintenance of the other buildings. The concentration of
extremely poor and distressed people in the popular neighborhoods was
further aggravated.
Nowadays children living in projects perform dramatically worse in
education than children living elsewhere. In the North, children living
in public housing are roughly three times more likely to fail a grade
during middle school, more than five times more likely to skip compulsory
schooling, more than twice more likely to end education after compulsory
requirements and have, on average, about two years less of education.
Controlling for observable family background merely reduces these ratios
but does not change much the picture.
The concentration of disadvantaged people into the projects raises
the issue of whether this concentration could worsen the already de-
prived conditions of these families. A question that has primarily been
addressed for the US context 2. There is no clearcut consensus on the
answer. Some studies report that moving out of public housing does im-
prove some educational and behavioural outcomes (Katz et al., 2001).
Some other studies do not find any effect of public housing (Jacob, 2004;
Newman et al., 1999), while others suggest that public housing is help-
full for the education of children (Currie et al., 2000). The design of
projects itself is deemed to be responsible for the social distress inside
projects (Newman, 1972). The theme of “ghettoization” of projects is
alive not only in the international academic literature. In Italy, news-
paper articles3, new complementary housing policies 4 and volunteering
organizations5 support the same feeling.
2Even tough Italy and US presents many similarities in the housing arena (in-
centives for house property, low share of public housing in the rental sector, long
waiting lists, etc.) they undertook different paths. The US tried to switch toward a
tenant-based assistance, Italy chose a side policy to public housing. The mere fact
that policies’ answers are different in the two countries rises the question if the under-
lying environments are indeed different. Second, Italy is marked by a different story
of public housing, above all in its expansion part in the 1960s due to the structural
migration. Still, management, design, dimension, location and social composition of
projects cannot assumed to be the same in the two countries.
3See for example, Corriere della Sera 29 August 2003.
4See the Italian Ministry of Infrastructure’s website: www.infrastrutture.gov.it.
5Comitato Inquilini Molise-Calvairate, an organization that provides social and
educational assistance to children living in projects.
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Since its inception, the Italian housing policy for low-income house-
holds has never undergone radical changes. To notice, children are the
indirect and involuntary recipients of the public housing policy. Does
public housing help its disadvantaged recipients when targeted to (fami-
lies with) kids?
This paper tries to investigate whether the Italian public housing of
the North constitutes a ghetto that worsens the condition of children
or, instead, if that policy does not add anything to the already disad-
vantaged conditions of its young recipients. As (in kind) rent subsidy,
public housing could also make these children better off. The existence
of a (positive or negative) causal relationship between residence in pub-
lic housing and children’s educational outcomes is important for a more
ample understanding of the current Italian public housing policy.
We use a pooling of the 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002 ans 2004 Italian Survey
on Income and Wealth (SHIW) and the 2001 Census data. The striking
advantage of using the Census is its huge sample size and the information
on the numbers of units in the building, that we need in our further
attempt to estimate the causal effect of (high-rise) public housing without
the use of an instrument. On the other hand, the Census does not contain
information on income, while the SHIW does.
We exploit the history of Italy for the construction of our instruments.
As in the North migrants from the South or other regions are more likely
to apply and live in a project, we use having both parents born in the
South or having both parents born in another region as instruments for
children’s residence in a project of the North. Both types of migrants
are roughly three times more likely to end up in a project than native
households. We also compare the outcomes of children living in high-rise
projects with those living in small/medium-rise ones.
We find that living in a project has an unfavorable effect on the
educational outcomes of children. However, for most school outcomes this
result is sensitive to our choice of the instruments and we cannot exclude
it is due to the disadvantaged conditions of these families. Only for the
effect of projects on female school evasion we can more convincingly think
of a ghetto effect. For high-rise public housing there is some evidence of
a ghetto effect, though this effect is not the same for male and female
and it seems to work in a different way in big cities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the litera-
ture on the topic, the functioning of the public housing policy in Italy
and the sociological theories behind the relationship between educational
outcomes and living environment. Section 3.4 presents the econometric
model and, in more details, our two identification strategies. Section 3.3
describes the data-sets we use and the characteristics of our sample. In
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Section 3.6 the results of the instrumental variable and difference in dif-
ference approaches will be presented, together with some informal test
on the validity of our instruments. Section 2.6 exposes some refinements
of our analysis and Section 1.7 draws some conclusive comments.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Related literature
The existing literature on the connection between residence in public
housing and socio-educational outcomes is almost entirely focused on
the US case and it is substantially concerned about the evaluation of
policies alternative to projects. In particular, a considerable stream of
the literature deals with the evaluation of socio-geographical mobility
experiments.
Kling et al. (2007) exploit the Moving to Opportunity program6 to
evaluate the (short-term) causal effect of tenant-based assistance on a
wide spectrum of outcomes. After five years from the experiment, they
find beneficial effects of the MTO on mental health (in particular), risky
behaviour and education for teenage girls and an adverse effect on the
same outcomes for teenage boys. Three years after the experiment, for
the only city of Chicago, they had found reduced behavioural problems
for boys, but not for girls and reduced number of friends in the new
neighborhood for girls but not for boys (Katz et al., 2001). Results are
restricted to the families that voluntereered for the experiment.
Similarly, Jacob (2004) uses the information on projects’ slated for
demolitions to evaluate the causal impact of public housing and high-rise
project on Afro-American students’ achievement. In his study, notifica-
tion for public housing’s closure does not seem to have an independent
effect on educational outcomes of children. Notification does only in-
crease the probability of school drop-out, but it has no effect on test
scores, absences and credits. Also high-rise projects do not seem to en-
tail negative effects on children outcomes. He estimates the effect on the
outcomes three years after notification.
The relevance of these studies for our purpose is that if the concen-
tration and/or the design of projects causes the distress, once children
6A program in which public housing tenants were offered, through a lottery, a
house-voucher to move into the private housing market. The offer of a house voucher
was of two type: one with no geographic restrictions and one conditional on moving
in a census tract with poverty rate below 10%, plus mobility counseling. The program
was limited to the cities of Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York.
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move out (and their parents still benefit from a housing subsidy) they
should be better off. If children in and out projects (in both cases with a
housing subsidy) have the same outcomes it means that projects do not
make them worse off than they already are. However, the effect of having
lived in a project can be long-standing and, as some sociologists underly
about this topic, people mantain relationships in the old neighborhood
(Souza Briggs, 1997). Moreover, short-run evaluations of these kind of
experiments may be not enough to purge the effect of “moving out” from
moving itself.
Outside of an experimental environment, Newman et al. (1999) use
the number of assisted housing units per income-eligible family in each
county to asses the long-term impact of assisted housing on children edu-
cational attainment in the US. It may be expected that households living
in places where there is a higher supply of assisted housing are more likely
to receive housing assistance. To avoid that factors affecting the supply of
assisted houses also affect children’s educational outcomes, they use the
residual of the supply measure from a regression that controls for local
area characteristics. They find that having ever lived in public housing,
the duration of that residence and at which stage of the childhood it took
place has no causal effect on children’s educational outcomes.
Currie et al. (2000) use sibling sex composition to estimate the effect
of public housing on, among others, the probability to be held back for
male. The choice of the instrument originates form the US Department
of Housing and Urban Development policy to assign a three-bedroom
apartment for families with a boy and a girl and a two-bedroom flat
for families with siblings of the same gender, unless they are very young.
Since the benefit of getting a three-bedroom is higher than getting a two-
bedroom apartment, families with mixed-gender children are expected to
be more likely to apply for public housing. They restrict the analysis to
male to avoid the argued correlation between sibling sex composition
and educational outcomes for girls7. They find a favorable and signifi-
cant effect of public housing on grade repetition, while the same effect is
still favorable but insignificant with OLS. It is possible that in this way
they identify the effect of having one room more, for instance, to study.
However, it would have been interesting to apply the same strategy in
our data, but the regional housing policy in Italy does not distinguish
families according to the gender of their children. It merely assigns flats
of different sizes according to the number of household’ members.
For the Italian set-up we have no experiments neither suitable data
regarding projects’ demolitions. Thus, our work will be on the motive
7See Butcher and Case (1994).
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of the instrumental variable approach outside an experimental setting.
Also, we add a different approach that does not require the use of an in-
strument, though it will asses a somehow different effect of public housing
and more precisely, the existence of a increasing in project’s size ghetto
effect and/or the effect of the design of the high-rise projects.
1.2.2 Public housing in Italy
Italy is the EU-15 country with the lowest share of expenditure for hous-
ing on the total welfare expenditure: 0.2% versus an average of 3.8% of
the former 15 European countries. The main housing policy has always
been to boost house property. Indeed, the rental sector decreased from
36% of the total stock to 20% between 1980 and 1999. Between 1991
and 2001 the Italian public housing stock decreased by 14.3%, thought
in the North the reduction was only 3.3%. In 2000 the national public
housing stock was 23.1% of the rental stock, in the North-East 19.7%
and in the North-West 27.7% (Federcasa, 2002). In Lombardy public
housing represents 4% of the total housing stock, Milan has the highest
percentage: 6.8%. 2.6% of the Milan population live in projects located
in the city, while 4% live in project in the surrounding areas (Irer, 2004).
Though small, public housing is the main policy instrument for the
housing of low income households. An alternative instrument is a system
of rent control8, introduced in 1978. However, in 1992 the private rental
market was liberalized. Nowadays, the “fair rent” still exists, mainly in
the South and as a marginal policy (Federcasa, 2002). In the context of a
free housing market, in 1998 was introduced a tenant-based policy, that
is a rent subsidy for low income households. Still, only 5% of renters
apply for this subsidy and the policy itself can only meet 82% of the
requests, overall, and even less in urban areas (75%). Also, the funds for
this subsidy have been substantially decreased in 2002 (Federcasa, 2002).
In the late 1990s some regions started to introduce a house voucher for
new married couples for the purcahse of their first house, continuing the
policy in favor of house porperty. These families have to satisfy some
weak crtiteria, like income requirements, limits for square meters of the
desired flat, etc.
The only new relevant policy for low income households is the “area
contracts” introduced for the first time in 1994. The area contracts
aim at revaluating the individual through his habitat, in areas of social
malaise and lack of economic opportunities that have often been identified
8The so called “fair rent” (or “equo canone”).
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with the most distressed project’s neighborhood9. Still, this policy is in
support of the problems originated in the projects or, maybe, by the
projects themselves.
As the stock of public housing is rather small, slots are assigned
through strict eligibility and priority criteria. The main criterion for
the assignment of a flat in a project is household’s income. The income
thresholds are determined by each single region and they considerably
vary from one region to the other. For example, in 2001 the maximum
income to apply for a household of two members was around 11000 euro
in Lombardy and 24000 euro in Emilia-Romagna. There are also income
limits to maintain the flat, once assigned. Regional laws provide numer-
ous regulations that in practice allow families whose income exceed the
limit to continue to stay in the project by paying a higher rent (Federcasa,
2002).
On one side the imposition of strict criteria does not allow to satisfy
the demand for public housing. Hardly more than 8% of the applications
for public housing are satisfied. On the other, the strict criteria define
a very disadvantaged social composition of projects. Moreover, the con-
siderable difference between the social and the market rent boosts these
families to continue to (unlawfully) live in the project even when require-
ments are no more satisfied (Federcasa, 2002; Irer, 2004). In 2000 the
ratio rent over income was 16.7% in the private market and 4% for public
housing tenants.
Other assignment criteria vary by region but in general priority is
given to elderly, lonely parents, handicapped or families with handi-
capped, households that live in sub-standard apartments and emergency
assignment occur for evicted families. Just to have an insight at the con-
sequences of these assignment criteria, we present some concentration
indexes for projects for the key Northern Province of Milan.
For every ex-prisoner living outside public housing, there are four ex-
prisoners inside. The percentage of people over 75 is almost two times
and an half higher in public housing than elsewhere. The index of con-
centration of non-EU citizens (mostly from countries such as Morocco,
Egypt, Eritrea, etc.) into public housing is 143 and for some project is
much higher (Irer, 2004). Overall in the North, for every handicapped
outside projects there are 3.24 handicapped inside10. In the next subsec-
tion we explain how the concentration of these disadvantaged categories
might affect children outcomes.
9Anecdotal evidence suggests that the bureaucratic regulation of these contracts
impeded the expected results.
101995 SHIW data for Italian families with children and living in the North.
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1.2.3 Conceptual framework
That fact that close neighbours matter is well documented in the lit-
erature (Goux et al., 2007). Projects are a scoially and geographically
defined context. There are many ways in which public housing can affect
the educational outcomes of children living in there. As a premise we
can assume that offspring of disadvantaged families are more suscepti-
ble to peer influence. Whereas, children of aﬄuent households might be
preserved from the neighborhood environment. The reason is that low-
status parents may spend less time than aﬄuent parents in the informal
education of their children, leaving more chances for their children to be
influenced by the external environment. The role of families as mediators
of neighborhoud influence is recognised, for instance, in de Briggs (Souza
Briggs, 1997).
The channels through which public housing can affect children achieve-
ment can be divided into six groups. The first mechanism is contagion.
Contagion may occur in terms of a pure preference: children mimic the
(bad) behaviors they see in their neighborhood just because they like it.
Children can also be harmed by other peers’ behaviors, as in the case
of violent peers. In this case peers’ contagion is a pure externality: it is
not necessary that children deliberately interact with other residents of
public housing. Contagion may also indirectly come through the stigma
or value attached to particular activities (Souza Briggs, 1997). For in-
stance the cost associated with pursuing a criminal activity is lower the
more people in your reference group practice it. Similarly, the lower is
the value of schooling for the peers you refer to, the lower will be the
stigmatization for not studying.
The second effect comes from adults rather than from peers, the so-
called adult role model (Souza Briggs, 1997). Since children in public
housing are likely faced with low status workers, unemployed and so on,
we can think they will form their expectations, their attitude toward
school and work on the basis of the adults they regularly meet.
The effect of public housing could also overlap with the effect of the
quality and quantity of local public goods (such as the efficacy of police,
the number and quality of schools) in which the projects are located. De
Briggs Souza Briggs (1997) defines this mechanism as the institutional
model. In this case are the neighborhood characteristics rather than,
more narrowly, the projects themselves that affect children outcomes.
On the other hand, a homogeneous environment, as it may be ex-
pected within public housing, can provide support and social networks
for the people that live in it. While a more heterogeneous environment
can induce a competition over scarce resources in which disadvantaged
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children would be the losers (Souza Briggs, 1997).
The design of projects itself can be at the origin of young’s prob-
lems. As Newman (Newman, 1972) writes, the quality of the community
depends on the control tenants have on their homes, what he defines
as “defensible space”. When this control lacks or is weak, the environ-
ment becomes a fertile ground for criminal activities and all its conse-
quences. He identifies high-rise apartment building, especially projects,
as the socio-physical environments where problems arise. In his paradigm
the territorial definition of space defines proprietary feeling, the position-
ing of windows allows residents to control the exterior environment, the
building form and idioms generate the stigma attached people living in
certain places, the location of the residential developments with respect
to activities has an effect on safety and so on. This is to explain how
the design of a building can influence the attitudes of its inhabitants. If
his seminal intuition in true, if it can be extended to educational out-
comes and if high-rise projects in Italy correspond to a lack of “defensi-
ble space”, it means that there may be an heterogeneous effect of public
housing across projects.
Finally, participation in public housing entails receiving an in kind
benefit that, in turn, increases the household’s available income. As long
as this income relief is devoted to children care and educational expenses,
participation in public housing should positively influence children edu-
cational attainment.
In the following analysis we will not investigate through which of these
mechanisms the effect of public housing (if any) shows up. However, the
empirical counterpart will be a balance of all these mechanisms. The
effect of the in kind housing subsidy on children educational outcomes
is expected to be non-negative. Whether the final coefficient for the ef-
fect of public housing will be positive or negative (or null), depends on
the balance between the former effect and the combination of all the
mechanisms explained above, discounted by the role parents exercise as
mediators for neighborhood influence.
1.3 Method
The baseline model is an OLS of the effect of public housing participation
on children educational outcomes of the form:
yif = α1 + β1Xif + γ1Fif + δ1Hif + ε1if (1.1)
where y is the educational outcome of child i in family f , X is a vector
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of individual characteristics (such as age and gender), F is a vector of
family characteristics (parents’ level of education, household’s income,
etc.), H is a dummy variable equal to one if family f the child currently
lives in public housing and ε is the individual error term.
However, there is a good reason to believe that project participation
is endogenous and hence the OLS coefficient δ biased. In order to get a
slot in a project households have to apply, but not all entitled households
apply. Thus, we may expect that applicants are systematically different
from non-applicants, also in terms of unobservable characteristics. If
more disadvantaged individuals are more likely to apply for public hous-
ing and less likely to achieve education, then the coefficient δ in (1.1)
should be upward biased.
We adopt two approaches to tackle the problem of endogeneity: in-
strumental variable and difference in difference. With the instrumental
variable approach we try to get rid of the unobservable determinants
of residence in a project by predicting the probability of living in pub-
lic housing according to some observable characteristics. As identifying
characteristic of residence in public housing we choose two alternative
variables, that will be further illustrated in next paragraphs. One is hav-
ing both parents born in the South and the second is having both parents
coming from a region different from that of current residence. The sam-
ple is restricted to residents in North Italy and properly selected, as
explained in the next subsection.
In our application we approximate the probability of living in a project
by a linear form, corrected for heteroskedasticity, for ease of the two-step
estimation. The first stage is as follows:
Hif = χ+ ϕXif + φFif + piMif + υif (1.2)
where H is a dummy for residence in public housing, X and F are
defined as in (1.1) and M is a dummy for migrant parents (from the
South or from other regions).
The second stage is:
yif = α2 + β2Xif + γ2Fif + δ2Hˆif + ε2if (1.3)
where the variables are defined as before.
Partially because of suggestion from the existing literature, partially for
technical reasons we also adopt a difference in difference approach. More-
over, the instrumental variable approach can be easily criticized on the
ground of the chosen instrument. Thus, we estimate the following model:
yif = α3 + β3Xif + γ3Fif + δ3Hif + ζRif + ξHif ∗Rif + ε3if (1.4)
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where R is a dummy equal to one for high-rise buildings, that is
buildings with more than a given number of units.
Although this model does not allow for a causal interpretation of δ, it
allows for a causal interpretation of ξ. In other words, ξ is the effect
of living in a high-rise project on educational outcomes, with respect
to children that live in different types of public buildings. However,
the causal interpretation of high-rise projects cannot be extended to the
more general effect of public housing. That is, the coefficients obtained
by instrumental variable and by difference in difference are not directly
comparable, as the first is the effect for children that change housing
residence due to the instrument and the second is the effect for children
that live in (a particular type of) public housing.
1.3.1 The choice of the instrument
12.5% of the Southern population resident in Northern Italy lives in pub-
lic housing, compared to only 3.5% of the local population. From the
early 1950s through the early 1970s, 4.3 millions Southern plus about
5.8 millions interregional migrants were looking for an accommodation
in the main cities of the North. A massive construction of public housing
initiated to address the serious housing shortage.
New and old migrants, generally, may attach a lower stigma than
natives of living in public housing, as when they arrive in the new place
they have less relatives, friends or acquaintances to compare their so-
cial status with. The migration flow during the Italian economic boom
was caused by structural deficiencies of the Southern regions and by the
endemic poverty of the countryside. We may expect a less selective mi-
gration effect in this case that when migration is a subjective and isolated
choice. These facts are at the origin of our choice of having parents from
the South or from another region as instruments for public housing par-
ticipation in North Italy.
We define two instruments, that we use separately. The first, from
now on SOUTH, is equal to one if both parents of the child were born in
the South, or only one in case of single parents. The second, from now on
OTHER, takes value one if both parents, or only one in case of single par-
ents, were born in a region different from that of current family residence.
In order for these instruments to be relevant and valid, they should be
correlated with the probability of living in a project but uncorrelated
with the unobservables influencing children educational outcomes.
As for the first requirement, rough descriptive statistics show that the
probability of living in a project for children whose parents were born in
the South is around three times larger than for children whose parents
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were not born in the South. Similarly, children whose parents come from
a region different from that of residence have a probability of living in
public housing more than two times higher than children with native
parents.
The second requirement is more cumbersome. We now provide some
theoretical motivations as why this choice could produce an exogenous
variation in the treatment, conditional on observable characteristics. If
living in public housing was merely due to the aforementioned specific
housing shortage, we should not be worry about the validity of our in-
struments. On the other hand, children of parents with a weaker social
network and, hence, attaching a lower stigma of living in public housing
could have systematically different educational outcomes. What we be-
lieve may cushion the problem in our data, is that the parents we identify
as born in the South are, with a high chance, offspring of the economic
boom’s migrants that we use as identifying determinant of project’s res-
idence11. Thus, the parents of our children sample may be born in the
South (or in a region different than that of residence), emigrated with
their parents when they were (very) young and then they may have stud-
ied, worked and constructed their social life in the North. A survey
of public housing tenants for the Province of Milan, indeed shows that
55.5% of migrants tenant arrived between 1950 and 1970 (Irer, 2004).
The “second generation motive” would also reduce the concern about
the selectivity of migrants.
If these parents are just the offspring of the 1950s-1970s migrants why
should they still have a higher probability of living in public housing than
native parents? A possible answer rests on the high intergenerational
transmission of homeownership in Italy, even within low-income families.
As many former migrants initially moved into projects, their offspring
(the parents of our children sample) were likely disadvantaged in home-
ownership because they did not inherit any property. Being in the rental
sector and with a low income increases the probability of applying for
public housing. Moreover, intergenerational transmission of public hous-
ing apartments is quite common and allowed by Regional Regulations12.
Still, migrants can have easily been discriminated in a series of as-
pects. Labour market discrimination can be partially controlled by in-
come. Then, lack of information, for instance about school quality, and
11A 25 year-old child in the 2001 Census means that he was born 1976 and his
parents most probably in the late 1940s or early 1950s. If his parents arrived in
the Northern cities during the massive economic boom’s migration (1955-1963), they
likely came as offspring of the first generation migrants.
12See, for example, Lombardia Regolamento Regionale n.1 10/02/04 Art.20.
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dialect differences13 can be less important for second generation migrants.
The research of Ichino et al. (1999) might cast some doubts on our
choice of the instruments. They investigate whether South-born and
North-born employees have different preferences with regard to working
versus shirking, among other explanations for the North-South shirking
differential. They indeed find that to be born in the South increases
absenteeism and misconduct. However, for those born in the South14
and working in the North they find that the effect is much milder, due
to a selective migration of low-shirking individuals to the North. In the
North, the region of birth makes no significant difference on absenteeism.
For our purposes, we should also underly that parents’ characteristics,
as the unobservables correlated with being born in the South, are not
transmitted one to one to children. Moreover, for “second generation”
parents the fact of being merely born in the South might not constitute
a distinguishing characteristic.
Among other possible critiques are persistent discrimination of mi-
grants, persistence in welfare dependency, etc. This is why we will devote
a section for an informal statistical testing of these assumptions.
1.3.2 The choice of the high-rise project treatment
The second source of identification of our analysis is the presumed non
systematic assignment of public housing applicants to high-rise or medium
and low-rise projects15. If the allocation of households to these two kind
of projects is random or at least uncorrelated with the household’s un-
observable, by differencing the outcomes of children living in high-rise
and those in medium/low-rise buildings we get the causal effect of liv-
ing in high-rise public housing for recipients. Waiting lists to get a flat
into a project are considerably long (a matter of years). Households are
assigned to flats according to the available slots in each municipality.
These households are ranked according to an index of the accommoda-
tion need and the period of residence in the region. Some criterion for
the assignment of flats concern the type of the flat and not the type of
13Istat data “La lingua italiana, i dialetti e ele lingue straniere” ((2006) show that
dialect is used slightly more in the South, even if in Veneto (in the North) the use of
dialect is more widespread than in Calabria (that is the Southern region where dialect
is most used) but it does not refer to the language spoken at home by migrants.
14These migrants moved in the North after being hired. Ichino and Maggi do not
have data on migrants before being hired, that could further reduce the role played
by the region on birth on the shirking level.
15In the US literature high-rise is defined as buildings with more than 75 units.
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the building16. Rents in public housing are determined according to the
household’s income and not according to the project’s amenities.
We want to test if high-rise can be different from small/medium size
projects, for several reasons. For example, Jacob (2004) distinguishes
between high-rise and small/medium rise projects and he attach to the
first the effects listed in Section 2.3. It may be that the relevant treat-
ment is not public housing in itself, but some specific characteristics of
public housing. Table 1.1 shows that projects are generally almost three
times bigger than privately owned buildings. As long as peer effects, role
models and the formation of social networks are growing as the size of
the reference group increases, we can expect that children in high-rise
projects suffer a stronger combination of these factors. The hypothesis
is that in small/medium rise projects peer effects are not in place or, if
they are, they are smaller. Also, in high-rise projects the chance to face
all the disadvantaged categories quoted in Section 2.3 is higher than in
small scattered project buildings.
The intriguing theory of Newman (1972) identifies in the lack of a
community feeling, widespread in high-rise projects, the root of social
problems. There are also high-rise private building, but in these the
communal spaces are preserved by the economic resources devoted for
their cure. Moreover, he notices that project size affects a social variable
such as the crime rate.
However, if low-rise projects are located in the center for physical con-
straints and high-rise projects in the suburb, the effect of public housing
could overlap with the effect of local public goods. Further, projects in
cities may represent something different than projects elsewhere. Thus,
we also restrict the analysis to projects in the nine biggest cities of the
North17, including city size controls.
To sum up, this approach checks whether there are heterogeneous
treatment effects and the hypothesis of joint causal and increasing effects
of peers, role models, social networks and the existence of a specific
project amenities’ effect.
1.4 The data
We use the Survey of Households and Income Wealth (SHIW) of the
Bank of Italy and the 2001 Census of Population and Buildings data.
16For example, households with a disable member have priority in the assignment
of flats located at the ground floor. The offer of flats should take into account the
size of the households and the dimension of the flat.
17Milano, Torino, Genova, Bologna, Venezia, Verona, Trieste, Padova and Brescia.
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The SHIW contains information either on (self-assessed) public hous-
ing participation18 either on attained education. It also asks for a self-
assessment of the neighborhood where households live (center, suburbs,
hills). The Public Use Microdata Census contains information on public
housing participation19 and educational outcomes but it does not display
the area of birth of the parents and the exact age of the children. Hence,
we had to switch to the original Census data-set, only available at the
Italian Statistical Office. This partially constrained our analysis.
We pooled the 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004 SHIW waves and it
turned out that sample size was still too small. We tried however to per-
form part of the analysis also with the SHIW data, but we restricted it to
two educational outcomes: early school drop-out and years of schooling.
We also used the SHIW data to impute parents’ income (missing) in the
Census. With the original Census we could implement the selection of
a proper sample size, free of attrition bias. First, we were able to get a
considerable sample of 14 year-old to use grade repetition as an outcome
variable. Then, we could get a considerable number of children evading
compulsory schooling in order to use evasion as one of the educational
outcomes. Also, in the original Census data-set there is information on
the number of units per building so that we could apply the difference in
difference strategy.
We measure educational attainment by four outcome variables: grade
repetition, school evasion, early drop-out and years of education. The
questionnaires did not directly ask if the child was held back or skipped
school. Notwithstanding, we could recover grade repetition and school
evasion by matching age, maximum educational attainment and school
enrollment. Grade repetition is a dummy equal to one if the child failed
at least once during lower secondary schooling. School evasion is equal to
one if the child did not complete lower secondary schooling. Early school
evasion takes value one if the child has no more than lower secondary
schooling and he is not enrolled in formal education.
In order for the SOUTH instrument to have a meaning and the sam-
ple to be homogeneous we restrict the analysis to children having non
foreign parents aged 18-25 (18-29 with the SHIW for sample size rea-
sons), born and living in North Italy20. As the original Census data-set
contains information on the whole Italian population we could refine our
18Residence in public housing is defined as when the owner of the rented flat is a
Public Housing Agency, the Municipality, the Province or the Region.
19Residence in public housing is defined as when the owner of the rented flat is a
Public Housing Agency.
20Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia-
Giulia, Liguria and Emilia-Romagna.
29
Chapter 1. Poor schooling of kids living in Italian public housing:
ghetto effect?
sample construction. We first selected families with at least one offspring
aged 14 or between 18 and 25. Then, we dropped all families living in
municipalities where there are no other families in the sample living in
public housing and families with overall income above 98.600 euro. Fi-
nally, we drew a random sample of families stratified by municipality
and residence in public housing. For both the pooled SHIW and the
final Census the sample consists of children. With the Census data the
analysis is separated for male and female. This was not possible for the
SHIW due to the small sample size.
The relevant sample changes according to the outcome variable. For
grade repetition we use the sample of 14 year-old, as repetition in primary
school is no more allowed in Italy. For school evasion the age range is 18-
24, as well as for early school drop-out. For years of education is 24-25 in
the Census and 24-29 in the pooled SHIW, as (on average) the minimum
expected age to complete tertiary education is 24. We would like to cut
the sample below 29 year-old to avoid the selection problem of offspring
still living with their parents, but this was only possible with the bigger
size of the Census sample.
1.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1.1 shows mean values of family characteristics for boys aged 18-
24 living in public housing and non, both for the Census and the SHIW
data.
Apart from the striking sample size difference of the Census and the
SHIW, the two samples are very similar. Descriptive statistics for chil-
dren of different ages are very similar (not reported). The comparison
between columns 1-3 and 2-4 confirms that households living in a project
are, on average, disadvantaged on a series of observable characteristics, in
particular income, level of education and migrant status. The difference
in family income is smaller for the Census, partly because in that sam-
ple we exclude families with income above 98.600 euro, partly because
income is imputed.
In both data-sets the only difference between the male and female
sample is in the educational outcomes, as shown by Table 1.2. Female
acquire generally more education and are less likely to fail a grade or
skip compulsory schooling. But is the within gender gross educational
gap for children living in public housing and non that is worrisome. When
considering offspring of low educated households, the difference between
the educational outcomes of children living in public housing and non
remains high.
Table 1.1 shows that children living in public housing have a proba-
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Table 1.1: Variable means (standard deviations) for male aged 18-24 by
residence in public housing
CENSUS SHIW
ph=0 ph=1 ph=0 ph=1
parents’ age at birth 29.3106 28.4881 29.1372 29.0909
(5.2545) (6.2062) (5.1054) (5.9427)
log family income 10.4396 10.0736 10.3177 9.2436
(0.4827) (0.6240) (0.8051) (1.9720)
parents’ education 8.7751 6.5887 9.4404 7.4545
(3.2372) (2.4676) (3.5987) (3.2988)
single mum 0.1029 0.2476 0.1138 0.2364
single dad 0.0304 0.0426 0.0202 0.0182
n. family members 3.8040 3.8349 3.7883 3.7818
(0.9407) (1.1792) (0.9143) (1.1497)
n. units in building 12.8686 33.3122
(22.9813) (36.5389)
high-rise building 0.0252 0.1034
SOUTH 0.1242 0.3539 0.1138 0.2545
OTHER 0.1787 0.4135 0.1691 0.2909
N 346832 17306 940 55
Standard deviations for binary variables are omitted. “ph=0” stands for residence
outside public housing, “ph=1” for residence in public housing.
bility to repeat a grade two times higher than children living outside .
Even if school evasion is very low in the North, it affects kids living in
a project around three and a half times more. The percentage of young
that ends schooling after primary education is higher for residents in
public housing, by 20% and 50% for male and female, respectively. Not
surprisingly, young living in a project have about 1.4 for male and 1.6 for
female years of education less than the other young with low educated
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parents.
Table 1.2: Educational outcomes by gender and residence in public hous-
ing, for children with low educated parents
CENSUS
male male female female
ph=0 ph=1 ph=0 ph=1
failure 0.2448 0.4157 0.1364 0.2553
N 6470 753 5867 701
sample 14 year-old
evasion 0.0171 0.0605 0.0076 0.0281
N 119370 10282 106553 8724
sample 18-24 year-old
early school leaver 0.5157 0.6649 0.2601 0.5219
N 119370 10282 106553 8724
sample 18-24 year-old
years of education 10.4372 9.0519 11.4215 9.8844
sd (2.613) (2.467) (2.464) (2.718)
N 49821 3902 40242 2886
sample 24-25 year-old
Low educated parents are parents with, on average, less or equal than 6.6 years
of education. Standard deviations for binary outcomes are omitted. Census data.
Children with migrant parents differ from those with native parents
in some observable characteristics (not reported). Migrant parents have
generally less education, among them there are more single mothers, they
live more often in big cities and in (private or public) high-rise buildings.
The offspring of migrant parents also have a lower educational level.
Concerning the social composition of high-rise and low/medium rise
public housing the only difference is in the percentage of migrants and in
the concentration in big cities, higher in the first category (not reported).
The fact that many migrants live in high-rise building is because they
mainly live in big cities, where these building are more common.
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 OLS estimates of the effect of project partic-
ipation
A simple regression of educational outcomes on participation into public
housing suggests a strong, significant and unfavorable correlation, even
with a series of meaningful controls. Notably, a similar exercise with
US data yields no significant results and public housing is even slightly
correlated with a reduction in grade retention (Currie et al., 2000) and
an increase in high school completion and years of education (Newman
et al., 1999).
Table 1.3 shows that participation in public housing significantly re-
duces education by 1.2-1.3 years. Table 1.4 shows the coefficients for all
educational outcomes: all cases point to a significantly unfavorable and
sizeable effect of residence in a project.
We may suspect that participation in public housing is correlated
with some unobservables that determine educational outcomes and thus,
the coefficient of public housing to be biased. In what follows, we will
try to recover the causal effect of public housing with the instrumental
variable and the difference in difference approach.
1.5.2 2SLS estimates
Table 1.5 shows an example of the first stage of our instrumental vari-
able estimation. The instrument SOUTH is the major determinant of
public housing participation together with household’s income, both in
the Census and the SHIW data. Table 1.6 summarizes the results of
the first stage for the two instruments and the different age samples of
children. Both SOUTH and OTHER are always highly significant and
considerable in magnitude with respect to other family characteristics,
at least in the Census21. Overall, households with both parents born in
the South are more likely to live in a project with respect to households
with two, non necessary Southern, interregional migrant parents.
Table 1.5.2 reports the 2SLS results obtained for all outcome variables
and with both instruments. All specifications point to an unfavorable
effect of residence in public housing on educational attainment. Whereas
this effect is always significant with the Census data it is not with the
SHIW. Again, this may be due to the high standard errors in the latter.
21The lack of significance of the instrument OTHER and the rather weak F-statistics
for the instruments with the SHIW data are to be attributed to the high standard
errors due to the small sample size.
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Table 1.3: OLS for years of education
CENSUS SHIW
male female all
dependent variable years of education
public housing -1.2142** -1.3134** -1.2806**
(0.0349) (0.0468) (0.3806)
male -0.8661**
(0.1518)
age 0.1481** 0.2373** 0.0967*
(0.0144) (0.0171) (0.0450)
parents’ age at birth 0.0429** 0.0295** 0.0554**
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0145)
log family income 0.2028** 0.2749** 0.7129**
(0.0235) (0.0248) (0.1438)
parents’ education 0.3121** 0.2546** 0.2939**
(0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0248)
single mum -0.5074** -0.4095** (0.3339)
(0.0329) (0.0335) (0.2630)
single dad -0.8362** -0.7824** -0.9963**
(0.0469) (0.0455) (0.3664)
n. family members -0.1812** -0.2224** 0.0169
(0.0093) (0.0103) (0.0867)
constant 2.6718** 1.5169** (0.7860)
(0.4188) (0.4590) (1.9007)
adjusted R-squared 0.1851 0.1554 0.2591
N 115238 96397 1419
sample 24-25 year-old 24-25 year-old 24-29 year-old
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered by family.
Other control variables not shown in the table are dummies for city size and waves’
dummies for Shiw. Income values are in 2006 euros, in Census are predicted with
Shiw data.
Before discussing more in detail the results, it might be useful to have a
look at the choice of our instruments, as these strong findings might cast
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some doubts.
Table 1.4: Baseline public housing coefficients
CENSUS SHIW
male female all
ph effect on failure 0.1607** 0.0920**
se (0.0118) (0.0102)
adjusted R-squared 0.0658 0.0357
N 43278 40572
ph effect on evasion 0.0276** 0.0114**
se (0.0019) (0.0014)
adjusted R-squared 0.0170 0.0089
N 364665 332559
ph effect on early school leaver 0.1922** 0.2087** 0.1440**
se (0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0528)
adjusted R-squared 0.1398 0.1061 0.1796
N 364665 332559 1919
ph effect on years of education -1.2142** -1.3134** -1.2806**
se (0.0349) (0.0468) (0.3806)
adjusted R-squared 0.1851 0.1554 0.2591
N 115238 96397 1419
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Control variables are as in Table 1.3.
Standard errors are clustered by family. The coefficients reported in the Table corre-
spond to δ in equation (1.1).
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Table 1.5: First stage with SOUTH as IV on sample aged 18-24
CENSUS SHIW
male female all
dependent variable residence in public housing
SOUTH 0.0613** 0.0614** 0.0466**
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0175)
male -0.0071
(0.0102)
age -0.0004* -0.0014** -0.0053*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0026)
parents’ age at birth -0.0006** -0.0007** -0.0018
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0010)
log family income -0.0340** -0.0282** -0.0680**
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0063)
parents’ education -0.0081** -0.0080** -0.0038*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0016)
single mum 0.0432** 0.0443** 0.0349†
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0183)
single dad 0.0254** 0.0216** 0.0094
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0391)
n. family members 0.0106** 0.0102** 0.0127*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0062)
constant 0.4667** 0.4236** 0.9130**
(0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0962)
adjusted R-squared 0.0577 0.0553 0.1101
F-test 1489.3200 1299.3900 15.8300
N 364665 332559 1919
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Other control variables not shown in the
table are dummies for city size and waves’ dummies for SHIW. Income values are in
2006 euro, in Census are predicted with SHIW data.
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Table 1.6: First stage coefficients
CENSUS SHIW
male female all
SOUTH on ph 0.0607** 0.0583**
se (0.0031) (0.0031)
F-statistics 395.2144 348.5689
sample 14 year-old
SOUTH on ph 0.0613** 0.0614** 0.0466**
se (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0175)
F-statistics 3384.9124 3199.0336 7.0800
sample 18-24 year-old
SOUTH on ph 0.0654** 0.0615** 0.0520*
se (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0207)
F-statistics 1149.2100 914.4576 6.3200
sample 24-25 year-old 24-29 year-old
OTHER on ph 0.0480** 0.0454**
se (0.0027) (0.0027)
F-statistics 327.6100 278.5561
sample 14 year-old
OTHER on ph 0.0458** 0.0466** 0.0212
se (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0147)
F-statistics 2496.0016 2462.1444 2.0600
sample 18-24 year-old
OTHER on ph 0.0466** 0.0451** 0.0436**
se (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0168)
F-statistics 804.8569 683.2996 6.7200
sample 24-25 year-old 24-29 year-old
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Control variables are as in Table 1.5.
Reported F-tests are for the instrument. The coefficients in the Table correspond to
pi in equation (1.2).
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Informal tests on the validity of the instruments
The 2SLS results rely on the fact that having both parents born in the
South or, more in general, migrants is not a determinant of school out-
comes, once controlling for observable characteristics. We perform three
different informal tests to check the credibility of our results.
The first test is as in (Evans et al., 1995) and consists in estimat-
ing a single equation model with both the endogenous variable and the
instrument. That is:
yif = µ1 + ν1Xif + λ1Fif + θHif + ρMif + ηif (1.5)
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 1.8 show this test for the instrument
SOUTH on the probability to repeat a grade during the last cycle of
compulsory schooling. For failure, the SOUTH instrument does not seem
to be truly uncorrelated with the unobservables driving the probability
to fail a grade. Columns 3, 6 and 9 in Table 1.9 and 1.10 summarize the
results for the effect of the instrument on all outcome variables, given par-
ticipation in public housing. According to this informal test, only in one
case the instrument seems to be uncorrelated with the outcome variable:
for the probability of not completing compulsory schooling for female22.
However, if the correct specification of the model is a 2SLS model, then
the single-equation model and hence this test is misspecified, but still
interesting.
To support and check the reliability of these results we also use a
slightly different test. We regress the outcome variables on the instru-
ment, separated for children living in public housing and not living in
public housing. That is:
yif = µ2 + ν2Xif + λ2Fif + ψMif + ωif forHif = k (1.6)
where k takes value 1 for residents in public housing and 0 for the
others.
Columns 1-2 and 4-5 of Table 1.8 show an example. For grade repetition,
having both parents from the South seems to matter just for people not
living in public housing (but it is likely due to higher standard errors
in the public housing sample). In this way, we could avoid the problem
of misspecification and the correlation between participation in public
housing and households with non-native parents. In other words, this
second test gets rid of the spurious effect caught by the coefficient on the
“instrument” through participation in a project.
22For years of acquired education with SHIW data, the standard errors are too high
to exclude this possibility.
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Table 1.11: Informal test for the household’s discount rate
dependent variable discount rate
SOUTH 0.0091
(0.0074)
OTHER 0.0039
(0.0065)
male 0.0093* 0.0094*
(0.0046) (0.0046)
age -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0007) (0.0007)
parents’ age at birth -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005)
log family income -0.0068* -0.0072*
(0.0031) (0.0031)
parents’ education -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.0007) (0.0007)
single mum 0.0129 0.0124
(0.0084) (0.0084)
single dad -0.0147 -0.0152
(0.0140) (0.0140)
n. family members -0.0057† -0.0057†
(0.0029) (0.0029)
constant 0.1800** 0.1859**
(0.0437) (0.0433)
adjustedR-squared 0.0448 0.0435
N 846 846
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Other control variables not shown in the
table are dummies for city size. 2004 wave of SHIW data.
Columns 1-2, 4-5 and 7-8 of Table 1.9 and 1.10 summarize the results.
As in the previous informal test, the correlation between the instrument
and the unobservables that determine school attainment is negligible only
for female school evasion with SOUTH as an instrument. The effect of
SOUTH or OTHER on failure goes in opposite directions for the two
subsamples of children (living and not living in a project).
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On the other hand, an additional test performed with the 2004 SHIW
data shows that there is no correlation between the household’s head dis-
count rate and the variables SOUTH or OTHER. The discount rate may
be an important factor in explaining parents’ investments in their chil-
dren education. We recover the discount rate from a question asking how
much the head of the household would have been available to renounce
in order to get immediately a premium23. We then assign its value to his
child and regress it on the same set of control variables as in all other
regressions. Table 1.11 shows the results of this test. The estimates
are from an OLS regression of the discount rate on the usual control
variables, plus those we use as instruments in our 2SLS approach.
To sum up, most 2SLS coefficients are probably biased (upward for
grade repetition, school evasion and early school leavers and downward
for years of education) by the correlation between the instrument and
the unobservable determining the educational outcomes24. However, for
female school evasion the SOUTH instrument seems to be more credi-
ble. In this case, the 2SLS coefficient is significant and bigger than the
OLS one, suggesting that OLS underestimates the ghetto effect of public
housing. Also, if we believe the bias is reduced for the outcome of grade
repetition, we still find an unfavorable and significant effect of public
housing.
1.5.3 Difference in difference estimates
As a last step to identify the causal effect of a specific type of public
housing, Table 1.12 shows the estimates of equation (1.4) for boys. The
effect of living in a high-rise project on school attainment is generally
unfavorable for boys and also significant for early school drop-out and, at
the 10% significance level, for years of education. Table 1.13 summarizes
the results with different definitions of high-rise buildings25 and for both
genders. Three facts are worth notice about Table 1.13. First, the effect
of project’s size seems to be non linear. Second, high-rise projects seem to
be more beneficial for girls than for boys. Last, the effect of big projects
on school evasion is negative for all gender-size combinations, thought it
is only significant for female living in projects with more than 75 units
23See Appendix for the derivation.
24Another reason could be the imprecision of the imputation of family income. If
migrants were discriminated in the labour market, for example on the wage level, the
wrong imputed income would distort the effect of being the offspring of a migrant
family. Indeed, in Table 1.3 family income has much less explanatory power in the
Census than in the SHIW.
25High-rise buildings are defined as buildings with more than 20, 50 and 75 units.
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and it is generally a small effect. Pherhaps, social control is higher in
bigger buildings and, probably, especially for girls. Table 1.15 shows that
the number of units in the project has a linear, yet small and rather weak,
effect only on grade failure, both for boys and for girls.
Table 1.12: Coefficients of high-rise (20) public housing on male
dependent variable fail evasion early leaver years of edu
high-rise (20) ph 0.0211 -0.0025 0.0210* -0.1300†
(0.0228) (0.0041) (0.0082) (0.0711)
high-rise (20) 0.0155** 0.0022** 0.0109** -0.0445†
(0.0043) (0.0006) (0.0028) (0.0233)
public housing 0.1454** 0.0283** 0.1784** 0.0000
(0.0171) (0.0024) (0.0056) (0.0000)
age 0.0002 0.0028** 0.1479**
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0144)
parents’age at birth -0.0032** -0.0001* -0.0079** 0.0428**
(0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0016)
log family income -0.0024 -0.0073** -0.0178** 0.2028**
(0.0052) (0.0008) (0.0029) (0.0235)
parents’education -0.0206** -0.0022** -0.0443** 0.3120**
(0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0031)
single mum 0.0706** 0.0076** 0.1015** -0.5076**
(0.0084) (0.0010) (0.0036) (0.0329)
single dad 0.1054** 0.0147** 0.1557** -0.8367**
(0.0145) (0.0016) (0.0047) (0.0469)
n. family members 0.0234** 0.0059** 0.0323** -0.1817**
(0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0092)
constant 0.3430** 0.0796** 0.8648** 2.6908**
(0.0471) (0.0079) (0.0321) (0.4187)
adjustedR-squared 0.0661 0.0170 0.1399 0.1851
N 43278 364665 364665 115238
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered by family.
Other control variables not shown in the table are dummies for city size. Census data
only.
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By restricting the analysis to the nine biggest cities in the North,
living in a high-rise projects significantly and positively increases the
probability of failure for female (with the 20 units cut-off) and early
school drop-out for male (with the 50 units cut-off). Table 1.14 reports
the results.
There is no clear cut evidence of an heterogeneous treatment effect
of public housing. However, living in a high-rise project appear to have
a more adverse effect on boys than for girls. For female, this effect is
particularly strong in big cities on the chance of grade repetition.
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Table 1.15: Coefficients for the number of units of public housing by
gender, in big cities
male female
n. of units of ph on failure 0.0008† 0.0006†
se (0.0004) (0.0004)
sample 14 year-old
n. of units of ph on evasion 0.0000 0.0001
se (0.0001) (0.0001)
sample 18-24 year-old
n. of units of ph on early school leaver 0.0003 0.0001
se (0.0002) (0.0002)
sample 18-24 year-old
n. of units of ph on years of education -0.0012 -0.0002
se (0.0014) (0.0015)
sample 24-25 year-old
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. The number of units is a continuos
variable. Census data only.
1.6 Robustness checks
We adopted several checks to control the reliability of our analysis. First,
we support the SHIW analysis with Census data. On the one hand, the
Census sample is huge and attrition-free. On the other, household’s
income is not as precise as in the SHIW, were income is not imputed.
Moreover, the findings of the informal tests reported in the previous pages
led us to resize our 2SLS results. To address this drawback and to test a
different specification of the treatment we also performed a difference in
difference estimation.
We added three last checks to this analysis. Firstly, we estimate pro-
bit and bivariate probit to assess if our findings are driven by the choice
of a linear probability model and we find that this is not the case. The
coefficients obtained generally retain the sign and significance as in the
linear approximation. Second, we tried a different definition of both in-
struments. As we suspected that parents married with people from the
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same (macro) area might be sistematically different from other parents,
we redefine the instruments as having at least one parent (instead of
both) born in the South or from another region. Again, we find that
this refinement does not really change our findings and it also weakens
our first stage estimates. The SHIW data-set provides a self-assessed of
the neighborhood of residence. We added this variable26 in our 2SLS
estimation to control whether the effect of public housing could be a
spurious effect for (bad) local public goods. The results do not support
this confounding effect as the coefficient of public housing does not sub-
stantially changes, but the small sample size of the SHIW data and the
self-assessment of the neighborhood warn us to be cautious with this
conclusion.
1.7 Final remarks
A simple analysis provides a clear evidence of an unfavorable correla-
tion between public housing and children’s educational outcomes, that
is just partially reduced by controlling for some important observable
family’s characteristics. The analysis also shows the shortcoming of the
instrumental variable approach. Our results, as Currie et al. (2000) and
Newman et al. (1999) results, might be due to the choice of the instru-
ment. In Currie et al. (2000) the bias is likely towards a positive effect of
public housing, as they use the possibilty to apply for an extra bedroom
in a project as the instrument. Our instruments likely overestimate the
negative effect of living in a project. But we can still say something for
some educational outcomes.
More specifically, the SOUTH instrument appears to be exogenous
for girls on school evasion and still the effect of public housing remains
unfavorable and significant. The instrumented coefficient is more unfa-
vorable than the non instrumented one, showing that, at least for female
school evasion, the low performance of these girls is not explained by
the sorting of families into public housing. Thus, the 2SLS result for for
female school evasion with SOUTH as instrument supports the intuition
of a dominant negative ghetto effect. This finding is consistent with the
anecdotal and literature evidence on the behavioural problems, rather
than the cognitive capabilities, of children living in public housing. Still,
we cannot exclude that being an offspring of a migrant family drives the
result for the other educational outcomes.
The number of families living in a project seems to worsen the effect of
the concentration of truly disadvantaged people in the same environment
26We divided neighborhoud in three categories: center, suburb and rural areas.
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only in some particular cases, but it does not seem decisive. For boys,
the effect is significantly unfavorable on the probability of early school
drop-out and on years of education. For girls, the effect shows up in the
probability of grade repetition, especially when they live in big cities.
A ghetto effect in the Northern Italian projects (though a stronger
proof is needed) might be the result of the restrictiveness of the Ital-
ian public housing policy itself. Rigid assignment criteria for a slot into
public housing necessarily lead to the concentration of the most disadvan-
taged families, in a way that may harm the future of its young recipients.
Nowadays, the public housing policy in Italy seems to go in the direction
of a further concentration of disadvantaged people into projects, with
all its possible consequences. Moreover, such a policy is indifferently
targeted to families with or without children. And the design of these
buildings may not help.
Future research using different identification strategies would allow a
better understanding of the relationship between Italian housing projects
and socio-educational outcomes and, possibly, the mechanisms it works
through. It would also be interesting to shed more light on the relation-
ship between the (persistent) educational disadvantage of interregional
migrants’ offspring and residence location in Italy.
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Appendix Chapter 1
Derivation of the discount rate
They notify you a lottery prize equal to the net yearly income of your
household. Such prize will be given to you in one year. If you renounce
to part of this prize, you will instead withdraw the residual amount im-
mediately.
1) Would you be available to renounce to 5% of this amount in order
to get immediately this prize ?
Yes → Question 2; No → Question 4
2) Would you be available to renounce to 10% of this amount in order to
get immediately this prize ?
Yes → Question 3; No → Stop
3) Would you be available to renounce to 20% of this amount in order to
get immediately this prize ?
Yes → Stop; No → Stop
4) Would you be available to renounce to 3% of this amount in order to
get immediately this prize ?
Yes → Stop; No → Question 5
5) Would you be available to renounce to 2% of this amount in order to
get immediately this prize ?
Yes → Stop; No → Stop
If we define p as the percentage of the prize that the individual is avail-
able to loose in order to get the prize immediately and x of the amount
of the reward and δ, the choice is given by:
x(1− p) = x
1 + δ
(1.7)
where the left hand side is the net present value of the prize. The
discount rate is:
δ =
p
1− p (1.8)
The choice of conflicting answers is prevented by the sequence of the
questions. We used the maximum amount the individual is available to
loose to define the chosen p.
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The imputation of households’ income from SHIW data
Data-set used : 2004 wave of SHIW data.
Sample: over 15 year-old living in the North, foreigners are excluded.
Number of observation: 3184.
Dependent variable: logarithm of individual income.
Variables included : gender, age, age square, civil status, civil status in-
teracted with gender, level of education (categorical), occupation and
employment status, sector and region of residence.
Estimation method : OLS.
Imputation: we imputed individual income in the Census with the co-
efficients obtained as above, we then transformed logarithms in natural
values, summed them at the household’s level and transformed to loga-
rithm again.
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Chapter 2
A deeper insight into the
ethnic make-up pf schools
2.1 Introduction
The “white flight” from predominantly “black” schools is an issue that
has attracted the attention of many governments and has also been doc-
umented in some studies (Nusche, 2009; Gramberg, 2007). The challenge
is to understand what is the effect of migrant students on both native’s
and minority’s achievement and to detect appropriate policies. The lit-
erature about the effect of the ethnic composition of classes on pupils’
achievement does not provide a clear and easy picture of the issue. How-
ever, some general observations can be drawn.
Primarily, it is commonly assumed that part of the effect of the share
of ethnic minorities on test scores is driven by the selection and self-
selection of students into schools. The pure effect of having schools with
more ethnic minorities students is generally found to be negative (Hoxby,
2000; Hanushek et al., 2002), though in some studies it does mot seem
to be significant, especially in experimental settings (Card and Roth-
stein, 2006; Angrist and Lang, 2004). Further, there is a shared evidence
that the proportion of ethnic minorities students in a class mainly af-
fects ethnic minority pupils and it has nearly no effect on native children
(Hoxby, 2000; Angrist and Lang, 2004; Card and Rothstein, 2006; Gould
et al., 2004; Hanushek et al., 2002). In particular, for the US the ef-
fect is stronger for the proportion of Afro-Americans on Afro-Americans
themselves (Hoxby, 2000). There is no evidence that, if any, the effect
of the ethnic share is stronger for language skills than for mathematical
abilities.
The fact that different ethnicities have different influences of the eth-
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nic majority group and on themselves is somehow puzzling. Why a class
with 50% Afro-Americans should perform worse than a class with 50%
Hispanic or Asian? Could it be that is not (or not only) the effect of
being a Afro-American, having a given culture or having a long past of
distress and discrimination, but the fact to study in school and classes
in which they constitute the main ethnic minority? What is missing in
the existing literature in applied economics of education is a look at how
ethnic minorities form the ethnic share. What is done is to study whether
the effect of having a class with 50% Afro-Americans has the same effect
as having 50% Hispanics, not whether the effect of having 50% students
from cultures different from that of the majority group are made up by
a single or a dominant ethnicty or by a variety of different ethncities.
From minorities analyzed as a “black box” to ethnic specific analysis,
the “mixing” of different minority groups is not considered in this type
of literature1. We want to point out that diversity in the ethnic make-up
of a class can play a role in education and other social aspects of the life
of young students.
Ethnic diversity can stimulate the creativity of students, can increase
the incentive to adopt the instructional language and culture, can reduce
the feeling of ethnic identification and the consequences it may generate
and may also make the job of teachers more difficult. The contribution
of this paper is to investigate whether ethnic diversity matters for school
achievement, for who it matters and which can be the mechanisms it may
generate. We want to show that apart from the quota of “immigrants”
in a class, also the composition of this share matters.
We use a rich data-set about primary school education in the Nether-
lands, that allows us to exploit the within school time variation in ethnic
diversity in order to estimate a causal effect of diversity on test scores.
We find ethnic diversity has an overall positive impact on test scores,
especially for language skills. This effect is significant for minority stu-
dents, in particular in the last years of primary education. The positive
effect holds for migrant pupils even at considerable high level of minority’s
share. On the other hand, we find a negative effect of ethnic diversity on
the school social environment for the same group of children. So we think
that a less favorable social environment may generate some competitive
behaviour among pupils. We do not find a strong evidence that an eth-
nically heterogeneous composition of the classes significantly worsen the
relationship between teachers and pupils.
1However, the topic of ethnic fragmentation is extensively investigated in the macro
and political economy literature and in experimental studies about firms’ performance.
For a rich review of these other streams of literature, see Alesina and La Ferrara
(2005).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains why ethnic
diversity can play a role in school achievement, in relation to existing
studies about ethnicity and the processes it may generate. Section 2.2.1
describes our measure of ethnic diversity. In Section 2.3 we explain the
method used to estimate the causal effect of ethnic diversity on test scores
and some refinement of the analysis. Section 3.3 introduces the data
about primary school in the Netherlands and some descriptive statistics.
Section 3.6 presents the results about ethnic diversity for the linear and
the non-linear model. Section 2.6 strengthens our analysis with some
robustness checks. Section 2.7 is an attempt to support some explanation
about the mechanisms there can be behind the effect of ethnic diversity
on test scores. Finally, Section 3.8 draws some conclusive comments.
2.2 Ethnic diversity
Ethnic identification and social behaviour is a topic that has long in-
terested scholars. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduce the concept of
identity in the utility function to explain apparently non-rational eco-
nomic behaviours. They explicitly associate identity and self-image. In
their model identification with the dominant group and its associated pre-
scribed behaviour depends on the extent of the social exclusion imposed
by the dominant culture, on the loss in economic returns for individu-
als of the non-dominant culture for adopting the behaviour prescribed
for the dominant group and on the negative externality imposed by the
non-dominant group on the peers of their group who choose the activ-
ity associated with the dominant culture. Some reasonable values of
these factors generate a mixed equilibrium in which some individuals of
the non-dominant culture adopt the self-destructive behaviour known as
“oppositional identity”. In the context of school, diversity can enter the
utility function in the process generating the ethnic identification and its
associated behaviour. If pupils consider as a reference group only the stu-
dents of their own ethnicity and not the wider group of non-native pupils
and if the negative externality imposed by the reference group is an in-
creasing function of the distribution of their ethnic group in the class,
then ethnic diversity can generate equilibria with more non-native pupils
adopting the dominant identity and behaviour. With special reference
to education, Akerlof and Kranton (2002) describe the utility function
of a student as composed by two parts: one follows standard economic
theory (ability and effort) and the other follows the concept of identity.
The second part of the utility function is maximized by the student by
choosing a social category (for instance, “burnout”) in order to balance
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the social status corresponding to that category with “fitting in”, that in
turn depends on the characteristics of the student (for instance, ability
and look). In this model, ethnic diversity can have a (“positive”) effect
of the choice of the social category if the weight associated to the identity
part of the utility function is a (decreasing) function of diversity.
Fryer and Torelli (2005) demonstrate that there are large racial differ-
ences in the relationship between the students’ popularity and their aca-
demic achievement, corresponding to the notion known as “acting white”.
Blacks are found to have a considerable more pronounced negative cor-
relation between popularity and achievement than Whites. Interestingly,
Fryer and Torelli (2005) find that the “acting white” behaviour is al-
most non existent in predominantly black schools and in schools where
interracial contact is low. They explain this finding with a two-audience
signaling model where racial differences in the relationship between social
status and academic achievement arise and are exacerbated in environ-
ments with more interracial contacts. If ethnic diversity deteriorates
somehow the social interaction of pupils, it may have, on the other side,
beneficial effects on achievement.
Furthermore, diversity can enrich students. A seminal paper of Lazear
(1998) argues that as long as the ethnic minority culture is relevant,
not overlapping with that of the majority group and understandable
it enriches the majority group and viceversa. He argues that diversity
may enrich the environment where individuals live and trade and may
contribute to greater creativity. By extending the theory of Lazear (1998)
to multiple ethnic minority groups we can apply this idea in the context
of school achievement.
Bridging the theory of Lazear (1998) and the conclusions of Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) and Fryer and Torelli (2005), O’Reilly et al. (1997)
find that diversity is associated with an increase in conflict and that
conflict has a negative impact on firm performance. In particular, they
find that ethnic diversity has a positive effect on group performance but
this effect occur independent of conflict, not because of it.
From a more pragmatic point of view, the value of assimilation is
larger for small ethnic minority groups. As common culture and com-
mon language facilitate trade between individuals a small ethnic minor-
ity group has a bigger incentive to adopt the majority culture or skills
as a mean for interaction (Lazear, 1999), unless different ethnic minority
groups form a common ethnic minority culture (probably requiring much
more effort and cohesion). In the school context, this incentive could lead
to achievement gains as instructional language and culture is set by the
majority group and teachers are mostly from the ethnic majority. As
long as diversity entails smaller shares of the ethnic groups and a decline
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of dominant minority groups, we may expect ethnic diversity to have an
effect on school achievement and, in particular, on language scores.
If ethnic diversity may entails benefits, it may also generate some cost.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) show that the provision of public goods
is lower in more fragmented societies, which they explain with a simple
model where the utility function depends also on the consumption of a
shared public goods and, since different ethnic groups have different pref-
erences over the public good to provide, a higher heterogeneity reduces
the utility. Indeed, a different hypothesis about the role ethnic diversity
in the context of school might comes from teachers. It can be easier
for teachers to deal with an homogeneous ethnic minority group. For
instance, teachers can devote some instructional time for the language
problems of one particular ethnic minority. The action of teachers can
become more problematic if teachers have to target specific instructional
time to multiple ethnic groups. Evidence in favor of this consideration
is found in Hoxby (2000), where a share of Hispanic between 66% and
100% has a positive effect on their school achievement. We may also
think that the cost for teachers of targeting instructional time to specific
groups of foreigners is lower the more “relevant”, widespread, closer to
the native and known is the culture of the minority group at stake.
We have mentioned the effect ethnic diversity might have in the con-
text of school and the mechanisms there could be behind. The primary
concern of this work is to investigate whether there exists any effect of
ethnic diversity on test scores, as a result of whichever of these mech-
anisms and in whatsoever combination. Furthermore, as the literature
points out that there may exist a relationship between ethnicity and the
social environment of students, we explore the issue of the relationship
between ethnic diversity and school environment.
For the purpose of this work, we can distinguish three broad and
interlinked channels through which ethnic diversity may work: social
environment, teacher’s attitude and (strategic) individual behaviour (as
may be induced by the social environment or directly determined) as
residual category. More in detail, we consider whether ethnic diversity
have an effect on interest in school, as suggested by Lazear (1998), on self-
esteem and social interaction, to be in line with the findings of Akerlof
and Kranton (2000), Fryer and Torelli (2005) and O’Reilly et al. (1997)
and on the relationship between teachers and pupils (as perceived by
teachers). However, we do not prove that if ethnic diversity has an impact
on some aspects of the school social environment, the effect of ethnic
diversity on school achievement is unequivocally and directly determined
by these aspects. We can merely exclude or welcome some of the above
mentioned hypotheses and leave the issue of whether the effect of ethnic
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diversity works via some forms of social behaviour or if the effect on
social behaviour is determined simultaneously with test scores open for
future research.
2.2.1 Ethnic diversity index
Non-native (student) population is quite diversified in the Netherlands.
Some ethnic minority students are the offspring of the decolonization of
Indonesia (and Moluccas islands), Suriname and Dutch Antilles. Some
are the offspring of the Mediterranean “guest workers” of the ’60s: mainly
Turkish and Morocco, but also Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, Greek and
from former Jugoslavia. There are also students with Chinese and Viet-
nam origins and some from countries of a more recent immigration path
and offspring of asylum seekers (Zorlu and Hartog, 2001).
We refer to ethnic diversity as an heterogeneous pool of minority
students, where ethnicity is defined on the basis of the country of origin.
The measure we chose for ethnic diversity is a continuous index that
takes into account both the share and the number of ethnic minorities in
the non-native group. The measure is an inverted Herfindahl index:
Dgst = 1−
K∑
k=1
m2kgst (2.1)
if K = 1⇒ D = 0
lim
K→∞
D = 1
where m is the share of ethnic minority k in grade g, schools s and
year t. The more groups and the more dispersed the groups, the higher
the index D. When D is equal to zero it corresponds to full homogeneity
of the ethnic minority group (e.g. there is only one ethnic minority in
the non-native group). Higher values of D corresponds to a rise in the
number of ethnic groups and to a lower variance of the ethnic groups’
shares. More precisely, the Herfindahl index can be decomposed into
two effects: the number of the ethnic minority groups and the symmetry
of these groups. The symmetry of the ethnic minority groups can be
measured as:
SYMgst = 1− [(1− 1
K
)−Dgst] (2.2)
where (1−1/K) is a measure of perfect symmetry for a given number
of ethnic minority groups K. This index measures the degree of asymme-
try among ethnic groups. Higher values of SYM indicates a more equally
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distribution of the ethnic minority groups. When the deviation from the
situation of perfect symmetry is very large, the index tends to zero.
2.3 Empirical strategy
2.3.1 Baseline model
The make-up of schools and classes is generally considered to be en-
dogenous. Parents who are very concerned about the schooling of their
children tend to choose schools with a small share of immigrants, espe-
cially when their children are particularly talented. The rationale behind
this choice is that parents look at the average test scores of schools and
schools with higher share of immigrants have lower test scores. How-
ever, simple averages cannot disentangle compositional and causal effects.
The same rationale may hold for the ethnic composition of schools, as
more open-minded parents or more able children may choose schools and
classes independently of the ethnic make-up (without clustering with rel-
atives and friends) and may opt for ethnically heterogeneous schools and
classes. The role of parents and ethnicity in the careful selection of the
school for the children in confirmed by Gramberg (2007) for the case of
Amsterdam.
In order to eliminate the sorting into classes we consider cohorts and
to eliminate the self-selection into schools we adopt a first difference
model within the same school. We consider separate learning functions
for native and non-native and for each grade. The model is:
yjgst − yjgst−1 =
αjgt−αjgt−1+βjg(Mgst−Mgst−1)+γjg(Dgst−Dgst−1)+εjgst−εjgst−1 (2.3)
∀ j, g combinations
where yjgst is the average test score (in language, mathematics and
reading understanding) of ethnic group j (native or non-native), in grade
g, school s and year t;M is the share of non-native children in the cohort,
D is the measure of ethnic diversity2 (common to both the native and
non-native groups), β and γ are ethnic (native and non-native) and grade
specific coefficients for the effect of ethnic share and ethnic diversity and
ε is the error term. Error terms are clustered at school and cohort level.
Since we consider average values, the model is weighted by the average
2For the measure of ethnic diversity we consider all the different ethnicities present
in the non-native group, while for the learning function we just distinguish between
native and non-native students.
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size of each group in the two consecutive cohorts, where larger weights
designate more accurately measured observations.
2.3.2 Non-linear model
We also consider non-linear effects of ethnic diversity. Indeed, the effect
of ethnic diversity can be non-linear in the share of ethnic minorities
students. For example ethnic diversity might not matter when the eth-
nic share is below a certain threshold. We insert the non-linearity at
the level of the ethnic share at which the change occurs. We define four
intervals, corresponding to the quartile distribution of the share of mi-
nority students: below 12%, between 12% and 33%, between 33% and
63% and above 63%. The model is estimated as a variant of equation
2.3, by interacting the term (Dgst−Dgst−1) with an indicator that assigns
the share of minority students of the initial cohort Mgst−1 to one of the
four intervals.
2.3.3 Robust model
We strengthen our baseline model by performing two additional checks.
First, within the same school changes in the index of ethnic diversity
from one year to the other can be endogenous. We instrument the ethnic
diversity index with the residuals from the grade and school specific trend
in the ethnic diversity index, as used in Hoxby (2000) for the share of
minorities. The instrument for ethnic diversity Dgst is ∆û, where u
derives from the following equation:
Dgst = αgs + φgst+ ugs (2.4)
∀ j, g combinations
The identifying assumption is that school/grade time trends in the
ethnic diversity φgs are well summarized by a linear time trend.
Second, if the share and the mixing of ethnic minorities varies idiosyn-
cratically from one year to the other, also other characteristics may vary
and affect pupils’ achievement. More precisely, if the change in these
(omitted) characteristics is correlated with the change in ethnic diver-
sity, the coefficients of ethnic diversity is biased. For example, a positive
change in ethnic diversity could corresponds to a positive change in the
level of education of parents. The model is estimated as a variant of equa-
tion 2.3, where we add a set of changes in some controls (Zgst−Zgst−1) for
other possible confounding effects. In particular, we control for changes
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in the share of parents with a low level of education, changes in the
proportion of male pupils and changes in class size.
2.3.4 Mechanisms
In the attempt to investigate the mechanisms driving the effect of ethnic
diversity on test scores we also consider the effect of ethnic diversity
on some subjective and relational outcomes for teachers and students3.
Indeed, the coefficient γ in equation 2.3 could be enacted through various
channels. The model we use is the same as in equation 2.3, where yjgst
is replaced with the average quality of the relationship between teachers
and pupils as perceived by the teacher, the average (self-assessed) school
well-being, self-esteem and social interaction of students. We propose to
use the last three variables to explain how ethnic diversity can affect the
classroom environment and the first to explain if teachers are affected
when dealing with an heterogeneous group of minority students. In one
set of questions, students are asked to evaluate the general aspect of
their classroom, while in the other set of questions teachers are asked
to evaluate their relationship with students. We consider the effect of
ethnic diversity on individual strategic behaviour as affected by the school
environment as a possible residual explanation.
As a cross check of the mechanisms there could be behind ethnic
diversity, we also consider a decomposition of ethnic diversity into an
effect of the number of ethnic minority groups and of the symmetry of
these groups. We estimate these separate effects by decomposing the
term (Dgst−Dgst−1) into the change in symmetry of the ethnic minority
groups (SYMgst − SYMgst−1) and the change in the number of ethnic
minority groups (Kgst −Kgst−1).
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
2.4.1 The PRIMA data
We use the PRIMA-cohort dataset, a large-scale survey of primary ed-
ucation in the Netherlands. The data were gathered twice a year from
1994 to 2004 in a representative sample of about 450 schools and in a
sample of 200 schools containing a relative large number of disadvan-
taged pupils. The PRIMA data contain information about students in
grade 2, 4, 6 and 8 of primary school. For some items the data are not
3Lavy and Schlosser (2007) use the same approach to identify the mechanisms
working behind gender peer effects.
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available for all grades. The data include test scores in language (Dutch),
maths and reading understanding, the degree of school well-being, self-
confidence and social interaction of pupils, the extent to which teachers
feel at ease with pupils and demographic characteristics of the pupils,
such as parents’ ethnic origin and level of education. In the Appenidx
we report the questions reported in Driessen et al. (2006), that they used
to construct the socio-relational outcomes.
We consider each grade separately and we exploit the longitudinal
feature of the data at the school level (not at the student level). We
dropped the combinations of school/cohort in which the share of students
with missing ethnicity of the parents was above 10%. We selected the
remaining combinations of school/cohort that have been observed at least
for three subsequent years, in order to render the results comparable with
the robust analysis4. Indeed, for the instrument presented in Section
2.3.3, we need at least three observations for each school in order to
obtain the residuals from a linear time trend. The reading understanding
test score was submitted to a random subsample of pupils in grade 6 and
8 and we have these scores only starting from 1998. Similarly, pupils’
self-assessments were given to a random subsample of students in grade
6 and 8, only starting from 1998 for the variable “social integration”.
Also for the variable “teacher relationship with pupils” was drawn a
random subsample and only starting from 2000, though for all grades.
As a consequence, the sample size for the regressions of each outcome is
different. The difference in sample size between native and non-native
for the same outcome is due to classes with only “foreign” students.
We assign the ethnicity to the student, based on the ethnic origin
of the father or, if missing, that of the mother. We standardize test
scores by grade and year, keeping the share of non-native students in the
representative sample constant at the level of the first year for which we
have the data.
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 lists the ethnic minority groups present in our sample and their
respective share, by grade. In the final sample native students account for
about 61% of the total number of students, the four larger ethnic minor-
ity groups are students with Surinamese, Turkish, Moroccan and “other
countries” origins. Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the out-
4The original and the “selected” samples are not significantly different in terms of
test scores and other characteristics. The only difference is that schools with more
foreigners are oversampled in the “selected” sample, as explicitly provided for by the
PRIMA-cohort survey.
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Table 2.1: Shares of ethnic groups, by grade
G2 G4 G6 G8
Dutch 60,94 61,35 61,55 62,13
(28353) (29417) (26144) (23861)
Surinamese 3,25 4,67 4,81 5,30
(1513) (2237) (2045) (2037)
Antillean 1,57 1,46 1,28 1,22
(732) (698) (545) (468)
Moluccan 0,20 0,25 0,31 0,33
(93) (122) (131) (127)
Turkish 11,85 11,16 11,01 10,66
(5513) (5349) (4677) (4093)
Moroccan 10,07 10,42 10,27 9,85
(4970) (4995) (4364) (3781)
Greek 0,06 0,04 0,04 0,05
(28) (19) (16) (20)
Spanish 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,22
(81) (79) (68) (83)
Italian 0,09 0,07 0,09 0,10
(44) (32) (38) (37)
Portuguese 0,15 0,14 0,16 0,19
(70) (66) (67) (73)
ex Yugoslavian 0,85 0,84 0,94 0,96
(395) (402) (401) (370)
Chinese 0,60 0,54 0,60 0,59
(277) (261) (253) (228)
Vietnamese 0,27 0,26 0,29 0,28
(126) (123) (123) (109)
Other countries 9,31 8,65 8,48 8,12
(4333) (4146) (3604) (3118)
Total 100 100 100 100
(46528) (47946) (42476) (38405)
Absolute values in parentheses. The sample includes combinations of
school/cohort in which there is at lest one student from an ethnic minority group.
come and explanatory variables, by native status. We only report the
descriptive statistics of grade 8, however the tables for the other grades
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are very similar. Apart from the native versus non-native test scores gap,
we notice that minority students have a slightly worse relationship with
teachers and self-esteem, a slightly higher level of school well-being and
social integration. With respect to demographic characteristics, ethnic
minority students are in classes with a slightly higher level of students
with a low educational family background and they are in slightly smaller
classes. Non-native students are in classes with a slightly higher share
of minorities and slightly more ethnically diverse, reasonably due to the
presence in our sample of all-minority classes.
Figure 2.1 shows the correlation between ethnic minority share and
ethnic diversity. The figure shows that there is considerable independent
variation of the two variables, that is cohort/school combinations with
the same share of ethnic minority students have different values in the
ethnic diversity index.
Figure 2.1: Percentage of ethnic share versus ethnic diversity index
However, for our approach we need enough and independent variation
in the ethnic diversity index. Table 2.3 shows that there is a considerable
amount of within school variation in the ethnic diversity index, that
explains about 33% of the total variance. Figure 2.2 plots the within
school standard deviation of ethnic diversity: this variation is present at
all levels of the share of minority students, though it is higher in schools
with a smaller share.
Figure 2.3 shows the correlation between the change in ethnic share
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics, grade 8
G8, native G8, ethnic m.
mean (sd) N mean (sd) N
language -0,08 1404 -0,63 1471
(0,45) (0,63)
math -0,11 1404 -0,32 1471
(0,54) (0,64)
reading -0,12 1005 -0,44 1049
(0,51) (0,57)
rel. with teacher 3,98 686 3,95 675
(0,39) (0,41)
well-being 3,75 1399 3,79 1463
(0,36) (0,4)
self-esteem 3,22 1399 3,18 1463
(0,3) (0,37)
social integration 4,10 1010 4,15 1053
(0,32) (0,33)
share imm 0,36 1404 0,40 1471
(0,28) (0,31)
share unknown eth. 0,01 1404 0,01 1471
(0,02) (0,02)
ethnic diversity 0,45 1404 0,46 1471
(0,27) (0,27)
cohort size 25,42 1404 25,14 1471
(12,15) (12,2)
share low fam.backg. 0,18 1398 0,21 1464
(0,2) (0,23)
share male 0,50 1397 0,50 1464
(0,13) (0,13)
Mean of average values for school/cohort combinations, per group (native and
non-native). Standard deviation in parenthesis.
and the change in ethnic diversity and we see there is considerable inde-
pendent variation, though there is a slight positive correlation between
the two measures (0.28).
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Table 2.3: Decomposition of variance in the ethnic diversity index
Grade Sum of squares Share of total DF
between school 72.49 67% 398
2 within school 36.42 33% 1141
total 108.91 1539
between school 87.95 68% 429
4 within school 40.55 32% 1202
total 117.10 1606
between school 75.30 64% 404
6 within school 41.78 36% 1266
total 128.50 1695
between school 69.80 64% 387
8 within school 39.74 36% 1111
total 109.53 1498
Figure 2.2: Within school standard deviation of the ethnic diversity index
2.5 Empirical findings
Table 2.4 and 2.5 show the results for the language test score, for each
grade and separated for Dutch and for the ethnic minorities group of
students. Ethnic diversity definitively increases language test scores with
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Figure 2.3: Change in ethnic share versus change in ethnic diversity
index
one (non significant) exception, that is for native in grade 4. For all
the other grades and for both the groups of native and “immigrants”
the coefficient of ethnic diversity is positive and especially significant
for the group of non-native. Table 2.6 and 2.7 report the results for
math test scores. The effect of ethnic diversity is generally positive, in
particular for “immigrants”, but the coefficients are not very significant.
The only significant finding is for non-native in grade 8, where the effect
of ethnic diversity seems to almost counterbalance the negative effect of
the ethnic share. For reading understanding (Table 2.8) we get strong and
significant results of ethnic diversity on non-natives in both the grades
for which this test is available.
Overall, there is no significant effect of ethnic diversity on the test
scores of native students. This result is consistent with the evidence
brought by the literature about the effect of ethnic share on school
achievement, where “foreign” students turn out to be the most affected
when a significant effect of ethnic share is found. Here we find that the
test scores of native students are poorly sensitive to both the share of
minority students and its ethnic composition. On the other hand, the
effect of ethnic diversity is always positive and often significant for the
ethnic minorities group in all the three subjects. The coefficients are
bigger and more significant for the students in higher grades, especially
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Table 2.4: Language, grade 2 and 4
G2, native G2, ethnic m. G4, native G4, ethnic m.
∆ share imm -0.026 -0.139 0.170 -0.343*
(-0.153) (-0.804) (1.074) (-2.283)
[-0.006] [-0.031] [0.038] [-0.081]
∆ eth.diversity 0.006 0.073 -0.107 0.257*
(0.100) (0.604) (-1.612) (2.460)
[0.003] [0.021] [-0.061] [0.080]
N 1025 1056 1155 1193
Table 2.5: Language, grade 6 and 8
G6, native G6, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm -0.137 -0.124 -0.089 -0.155
(-0.887) (-0.947) (-0.590) (-1.075)
[-0.034] [-0.032] [-0.025] [-0.039]
∆ eth.diversity 0.087 0.332** 0.023 0.289**
(1.556) (3.735) (0.462) (3.117)
[0.057] [0.130] [0.017] [0.106]
N 1096 1137 986 1049
Table 2.6: Math, grade 2 and 4
G2, native G2, ethnic m. G4, native G4, ethnic m.
∆ share imm -0.177 -0.242 -0.076 -0.260
(-1.062) (-1.519) (-0.467) (-1.545)
[-0.038] [-0.054] [-0.017] [-0.057]
∆ eth.diversity -0.044 0.055 -0.029 0.121
(-0.640) (0.487) (-0.441) (1.103)
[-0.025] [0.016] [-0.016] [0.035]
N 1025 1056 1155 1193
in the 8th grade and for language skills. Standardized coefficients re-
ported in square brackets show that the positive and significant effect of
ethnic diversity counterbalances the negative and rarely significant effect
of ethnic share, though a change of one standard deviation in the ethnic
share may not be comparable with a one standard deviation change in
ethnic diversity. The magnitude of the effect of ethnic diversity is better
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Table 2.7: Math, grade 6 and 8
G6, native G6, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm -0.158 -0.187 -0.037 -0.293†
(-1.064) (-1.129) (-0.235) (-1.950)
[-0.036] [-0.039] [-0.008] [-0.061]
∆ eth.diversity 0.068 0.134 0.021 0.198†
(1.051) (1.163) (0.349) (1.898)
[0.041] [0.042] [0.012] [0.061]
N 1096 1137 986 1049
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Beta coefficients in square brackets.
t-value in round brackets. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered by school.
Table 2.8: Reading understanding, grade 6 and 8
G6, native G6, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm 0.019 -0.132 0.214 -0.131
(0.078) (-0.791) (0.977) (-0.629)
[0.004] [-0.030] [0.051] [-0.031]
∆ eth.diversity -0.071 0.193† -0.034 0.320*
(-0.866) (1.761) (-0.484) (2.513)
[-0.043] [0.068] [-0.021] [0.113]
N 672 692 618 654
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Beta coefficients in square brackets.
t-value in round brackets. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered by school.
explained by an example. A one standard deviation change in ethnic
diversity (0.27) increases language test score by 10% of the standard de-
viation (0.63), for 8th graders. The gap between native and non-native
test scores in grade 8 is 0.55, so an increase in the diversity index of 0.27
points increases the test scores by 0.06 points, reducing the native/non-
native gap by 11%. However, a change in the ethnic diversity index of
0.27 points means going, more or less, from two equally distributed mi-
nority groups (D=0.5) to four equally distributed groups (D=0.75), that
is not a small change.
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2.5.1 Non linear effects of ethnic diversity
Tables 2.9 to 2.11 illustrate the results for the non-linearities in the ethnic
share, respectively for language, reading understanding and math test
scores. We only report the results for 6th and 8th graders. Some cautions
in interpreting these results are due, as the number of observations in each
cell is rather small.
Table 2.9: Non linear effect in share ethnic m. for language, grade 6 and
8
G6, native G6, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm -0.137 -0.113 -0.087 -0.158
(-0.893) (-0.872) (-0.583) (-1.098)
[-0.034] [-0.030] [-0.024] [-0.039]
diversity*share1 0.056 0.040 0.039 0.158
(0.790) (0.226) (0.634) (0.825)
[0.028] [0.007] [0.022] [0.026]
diversity*share2 0.152† 0.357* -0.012 0.337*
(1.746) (2.583) (-0.143) (2.353)
[0.057] [0.075] [-0.005] [0.068]
diversity*share3 0.088 0.414** 0.144 0.427**
(0.566) (2.965) (0.969) (2.591)
[0.017] [0.086] [0.029] [0.080]
diversity*share4 -0.304 0.444* -0.806 0.191
(-0.592) (2.318) (-1.625) (0.859)
[-0.017] [0.085] [-0.057] [0.034]
N 1096 1137 986 1049
Findings are non very straightforward. For all the three subjects, the
significance of the non-linear coefficients of ethnic diversity tends to con-
firm that the heterogeneity of the minority group mainly affects minority
students themselves. The sign of the effect of ethnic diversity is mostly
positive for most levels of the percentage of minority students. However,
if ethnic minorities seem to benefit from ethnic diversity the higher is
the share of non-natives, native students seem to be adversely affected
by ethnic diversity at high levels of the non-native student population.
Indeed, the magnitude of the coefficients in the even columns (minority)
of Table 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 is increasing by going from the top to the
bottom of the panel, while in the odd columns (native) the coefficients
in some cases turn negative, especially at high level of the ethnic share.
An explanation could be that when the share of minority students is
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Table 2.10: Non linear effect in share ethnic m. for reading understand-
ing, grade 6 and 8
G6, native G6, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm 0.024 -0.155 0.212 -0.102
(0.101) (-0.923) (0.958) (-0.492)
[0.005] [-0.036] [0.050] [-0.024]
diversity*share1 -0.095 0.399† -0.047 0.162
(-0.942) (1.657) (-0.575) (0.749)
[-0.045] [0.063] [-0.023] [0.027]
diversity*share2 0.012 0.346† -0.019 0.010
(0.089) (1.918) (-0.162) (0.046)
[0.004] [0.063] [-0.007] [0.002]
diversity*share3 -0.133 0.418* 0.006 0.438†
(-0.569) (2.230) (0.019) (1.918)
[-0.023] [0.072] [0.001] [0.078]
diversity*share4 -0.885 -0.297 0.156 0.665*
(-1.280) (-1.303) (0.211) (2.300)
[-0.047] [-0.055] [0.009] [0.117]
N 672 692 618 654
high, having minorities from many different ethnic groups may require
additional efforts for teachers, obtained by removing some attention from
native students. Overall, the coefficients for natives are almost never sig-
nificant, with a (positive) exception for math and language scores when
the share of minority is between 12% and 33%.
2.6 Robustness checks
Table 2.12 to 2.14 report robust results. We only report results for 6th
and 8th graders.
First, changes in the ethnic composition may be correlated with changes
in other observable characteristics of the cohort, like the proportion of
children with low family background, the proportion of male and average
class size. Even controlling for these characteristics, it does not signifi-
cantly change the results. Indeed, even columns of Table 2.12, 2.13 and
2.14 confirm the results found with the baseline model, that are actually
strenghtened. We also observe that natives are affected by the peers’
share of male, while minority students by the peer’s share having a low
level of parental education. Again, test scores in maths seem less sen-
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Table 2.11: Non linear effect in share ethnic m. for math, grade 6 and 8
G6, native G6, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm -0.146 -0.191 -0.036 -0.275†
(-0.992) (-1.156) (-0.229) (-1.799)
[-0.033] [-0.040] [-0.008] [-0.057]
diversity*share1 0.051 -0.170 0.057 0.101
(0.616) (-0.938) (0.774) (0.495)
[0.023] [-0.024] [0.025] [0.014]
diversity*share2 0.167† 0.227 -0.016 0.011
(1.875) (1.329) (-0.176) (0.077)
[0.057] [0.038] [-0.005] [0.002]
diversity*share3 -0.228 0.400* -0.124 0.364†
(-1.560) (2.514) (-0.682) (1.829)
[-0.040] [0.067] [-0.020] [0.057]
diversity*share4 0.185 -0.037 0.165 0.336
(0.306) (-0.114) (0.304) (1.324)
[0.010] [-0.006] [0.009] [0.050]
N 1096 1137 986 1049
sitive than the two language scores to the characteristics of the peers’,
including the ethnic make-up.
Moreover, changes in the ethnic composition within schools could
follow and endogenous path. Odd columns of Table 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14
report the results using the instrumental variable as in Hoxby (2000).
Again, robust analyses tend to confirm the baseline results, indicating
that changes in the ethnic diversity index within the same school from
one year to the other are not really endogenous. We also perform the
same analysis as in equation 2.3 on a restricted sample of schools/cohorts
in order to exclude outliers. We selected the combinations school/cohort
corresponding to the black mass of figure 2.3, whose change in ethnic
share in between −0.3 and 0.3, and the change in ethnic diversity is
between −0.3 and 0.3. The findings (not reported) confirm our previous
results, though we find some negative and significant results for grade 2.
Results for the other three grades are twice as large (and positive) as in
the full sample.
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Table 2.12: Robust regressions for language, grade 8
G8, native G8, native G8, ethnic m. G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm 0.005 -0.102 -0.039 -0.161
(0.030) (-0.675) (-0.255) (-1.105)
[0.001] [-0.029] [-0.010] [-0.040]
∆ eth.diversity 0.016 0.040 0.271** 0.330**
(0.321) (0.725) (2.850) (3.081)
[0.012] [0.030] [0.100] [0.121]
∆ low fam.back. -0.225 -0.286*
(-1.565) (-2.346)
[-0.060] [-0.084]
∆ share male -0.302** -0.079
(-3.487) (-0.800)
[-0.130] [-0.028]
∆ cohort size -0.000 -0.000
(-0.245) (-0.267)
[-0.009] [-0.011]
IV x x
controls x x
N 986 1049
2.7 Mechanisms of ethnic diversity
We find some different results for teacher’s related outcomes and pupils’
social behaviour. An increase in ethnic diversity rises the proportion
of native students who were advised to follow a low level track of sec-
ondary education (even by controlling for changes in average test scores).
Conversely, an increase in ethnic share reduces the proportion of na-
tive students who got a low advice for secondary school (Table 2.15).
So, teachers seem to have a positive “bias” towards non-native students
when the ethnic minority group is more heterogeneous. Ethnic diversity
does seem to make the job of teachers more difficult. In fact, the sign
of the coefficients in Table 2.16 and 2.17 is often negative, though not
significant. However, the coefficient for 8 graders is not far from being
significant. We find no effect of ethnic diversity and ethnic share on the
probability of a later drop-out of the student, as perceived by the teacher
(Table 2.15).
As shown in Table 2.18 and 2.19, if the ethnic share increases the
well-being and self-confidence of pupils, including natives, the effect of
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Table 2.13: Robust regressions for reading understanding, grade 8
G8, native G8, native G8, ethnic m. G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm 0.382 0.212 0.005 -0.147
(1.670) (0.960) (0.020) (-0.703)
[0.090] [0.050] [0.001] [-0.035]
∆ eth.diversity -0.052 -0.032 0.303* 0.411**
(-0.781) (-0.396) (2.406) (2.972)
[-0.033] [-0.020] [0.106] [0.145]
∆ low fam.back. -0.343 -0.464**
(-1.603) (-2.784)
[-0.074] [-0.132]
∆ share male -0.485** -0.235
(-3.590) (-1.585)
[-0.159] [-0.078]
∆ cohort size 0.003 -0.002
(1.350) (-1.066)
[0.061] [-0.048]
IV x x
controls x x
N 618 654
ethnic diversity has an opposite sign and, again, is only significant for
8th graders. Similarly, for social integration the effect of ethnic diversity
is generally negative and only significant for minority 8th graders (Table
2.20).
Though the outcome variables we use for the analysis of the mech-
anisms are very general, we find a striking negative and sometimes sig-
nificant effect of ethnic diversity. An increase in ethnic diversity reduces
(self-reported) well-being, self-confidence and social interaction of both
native and minority pupils. As all the three variables have a positive
correlation with test scores, it is natural to wonder how a negative effect
of ethnic diversity on the social aspects of the pupils’ life can translate
into a positive effect on test scores, at least for minority students.
Table 2.21 and 2.22 report the results for the decomposition of the ef-
fect of ethnic diversity into a “number of ethnicities” part and a “symme-
try” part. Both elements seem to be (favorably) important for language
and reading understanding test scores (Table 2.21), though it seems diffi-
cult to establish which of the two components is more important. For the
school well-being the symmetry of the ethnic minority groups seems more
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Table 2.14: Robust regressions for math, grade 8
G8, native G8, native G8, ethnic m. G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm 0.021 -0.029 -0.183 -0.300*
(0.118) (-0.179) (-1.073) (-2.002)
[0.005] [-0.006] [-0.038] [-0.063]
∆ eth.diversity 0.013 0.009 0.200† 0.251*
(0.207) (0.132) (1.891) (2.027)
[0.007] [0.005] [0.061] [0.077]
∆ low fam.back. -0.089 -0.404*
(-0.471) (-2.405)
[-0.018] [-0.100]
∆ share male -0.115 0.214†
(-1.177) (1.770)
[-0.039] [0.064]
∆ cohort size 0.001 -0.004†
(0.543) (-1.949)
[0.021] [-0.068]
IV x x
controls x x
N 986 1049
Table 2.15: Teacher advice for a low level secondary school (A) and
probability of later drop-out (D), grade 8
G8, native G8, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm -0.187† 0.150 -0.013 0.016
(-1.782) (1.026) (-0.403) (0.380)
[-0.122] [0.067] [-0.018] [0.016]
∆ eth.diversity 0.065* -0.016 0.004 0.003
(2.115) (-0.179) (0.423) (0.116)
[0.111] [-0.011] [0.015] [0.005]
N 321 341 489 514
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Beta coefficients in square brackets.
t-value in round brackets. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered by school.
important than the number of ethnic groups. Interestingly, the pupils’
self-esteem seems to be unfavorably affected by an increasing number of
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Table 2.16: Relationship teacher-pupil, grade 2 and 4
G2, native G2, ethnic m. G4, native G4, ethnic m.
∆ share imm 0.110 0.010 0.350* -0.184
(0.670) (0.061) (2.005) (-1.151)
[0.038] [0.003] [0.101] [-0.058]
∆ eth.diversity -0.001 -0.007 -0.074 0.086
(-0.016) (-0.046) (-0.967) (0.497)
[-0.001] [-0.003] [-0.054] [0.032]
N 373 361 398 372
Table 2.17: Relationship teacher-pupil, grade 6 and 8
G6, native G6, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm -0.015 0.196 0.277 -0.365
(-0.079) (0.869) (1.180) (-1.481)
[-0.004] [0.051] [0.069] [-0.099]
∆ eth.diversity -0.015 -0.131 0.047 -0.204
(-0.163) (-0.760) (0.496) (-1.456)
[-0.011] [-0.049] [0.031] [-0.082]
N 377 368 359 341
Table 2.18: School well-being, grade 6 and 8
G6, native G6, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm 0.014 0.319** 0.182 -0.130
(0.097) (2.737) (1.466) (-1.143)
[0.004] [0.092] [0.053] [-0.038]
∆ eth.diversity -0.032 -0.008 -0.110* -0.148
(-0.631) (-0.102) (-2.161) (-1.644)
[-0.024] [-0.003] [-0.084] [-0.064]
N 1091 1132 980 1038
ethnic minorities (Table 2.22).
What can we say now about the mechanisms there can be behind the
positive effect of ethnic diversity on test scores? The negative effect of
ethnic diversity on socio-relational outcomes may point in favor of an in-
terpretation of the role of ethnic diversity as breaking down the moment
of identity formation and all its possible (negative) consequences. The
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Table 2.19: School self-confidence, grade 6 and 8
G6, native G6, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm 0.165† 0.245* 0.265** 0.142
(1.650) (2.527) (2.630) (1.364)
[0.064] [0.086] [0.105] [0.051]
∆ eth.diversity -0.012 -0.011 -0.036 -0.136*
(-0.355) (-0.141) (-1.065) (-2.010)
[-0.013] [-0.006] [-0.037] [-0.072]
N 1091 1132 980 1038
Table 2.20: Social integration in the class, grade 6 and 8
G6, native G6, ethnic m. G8, native G8, ethnic m.
∆ share imm -0.316† -0.054 -0.146 -0.185
(-1.841) (-0.367) (-1.011) (-1.389)
[-0.108] [-0.016] [-0.051] [-0.062]
∆ eth.diversity -0.033 -0.066 -0.016 -0.168†
(-0.594) (-0.615) (-0.364) (-1.876)
[-0.029] [-0.028] [-0.015] [-0.083]
N 680 706 622 658
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Beta coefficients in square brackets.
t-value in round brackets. Standard errors (not reported) are clustered by school.
mere fact that ethnic diversity has an effect could suggest that pupils
consider the students of their own ethnic group as their reference group,
otherwise we should just find an effect of ethnic share. We can say that,
overall, ethnic diversity reduces social interaction and identification of
pupils that in turn may have a weaker incentive of punishing “acting
white” behaviours or “oppositional cultures”. We do not find a sup-
porting evidence of the idea that ethnic diversity may enrich the human
capital of students. Indeed, we find a negative effect of diversity on well-
being (that also includes a question about interest in school). On the
other hand, we find that the number of ethnicities (so the number of cul-
tures) does play a role in increasing test scores. Moreover, we do not have
test scores in subject such as history or geography, that could better mea-
sure this aspect. Hence, we cannot discard the theory of Lazear (1998).
With respect to teachers, it seems they are slightly overloaded when they
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Table 2.21: Decomposition of ethnic diversity, for the ethnic minority
group in grade 8
language math reading
∆ share imm -0.126 -0.285† -0.084
(-0.859) (-1.820) (-0.388)
[-0.032] [-0.059] [-0.020]
∆ n.ethnicities 0.023† 0.018 0.037*
(1.833) (1.256) (2.054)
[0.066] [0.044] [0.104]
∆ symmetry 0.280† 0.125 0.485*
(1.935) (0.647) (2.138)
[0.069] [0.026] [0.115]
N 1049 1049 654
Table 2.22: Decomposition of ethnic diversity, for the ethnic minority
group in grade 8
relation t-p well-being. self-esteem. social inter.
∆ share imm -0.381 -0.168 0.158 -0.211
(-1.582) (-1.449) (1.479) (-1.561)
[-0.103] [-0.050] [0.057] [-0.070]
∆ n.ethnicities -0.023 -0.016 -0.024* -0.016
(-1.386) (-1.157) (-2.502) (-1.497)
[-0.081] [-0.054] [-0.098] [-0.063]
∆ symmetry -0.239 -0.438* -0.063 -0.214
(-1.132) (-2.564) (-0.590) (-1.375)
[-0.063] [-0.127] [-0.022] [-0.071]
N 341 1038 1038 658
teach in too heterogeneous classes, though it does not seem that diversity
significantly worsen their relationship with pupils. Though we favor the
interpretation according to which ethnic diversity generates a trade-off
between (better) achievement and (worse) school social environment, we
cannot assert that is the worse social life of students that pushes them to
perform better. Indeed, the favorable effect of ethnic diversity on school
performance can come through a higher degree of (language) assimila-
tion, made it easier by ethnic diversity. The especially beneficial effect
of ethnic diversity on language proficiency may point in favor of this
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interpretation.
2.8 Final remarks
We have found that ethnic diversity does play a role in the learning
function, especially with respect to the acquisition of language skills. The
beneficial effect of ethnic diversity on test scores seems to hold even at
high levels of non-native’s share, for migrant students. The magnitude
of the effect of diversity appears to considerably reduce the eventual
negative effect of the share of minority students.
Consistently with the literature, we find that ethnicity has an effect
mostly for minority students, while natives do not seem to be affected.
We may think that natives and minorities base their behaviour as two
separate and with different status groups, thus the within group hetero-
geneity of the minority group does not affect native pupils. We also found
that diversity is particularly important for older students. A possible ex-
planation for this finding can be that ethnic identification, competitive
behaviour and so on are concepts that young children do not develop yet.
Furthermore, it may be that since we use cohort level data the level of
interaction and competition within a cohort rather than within a class
is stronger for older students. Ethnic diversity may work by implicitly
boosting minority students to adopt the dominant culture and by pushing
them to be proficient in the dominant language. Another interpretation
is that ethnic diversity reduces the scope of ethnic identification and its
eventual negative consequences, such as the penalty for “acting white”
and probably by inducing some other kinds of behaviours such as com-
petitiveness. Indeed, we observe a trade-off between the effect of ethnic
diversity on test scores and on the quality of the school social environ-
ment. The relationship between teachers and pupils can be hindered by
the heterogeneity of the class, though our data do not really support this
evidence.
In conclusion, ethnic diversity could represent a factor to take into ac-
count in the policy options fro migrant students, in particular in contexts
of free school choice where the “white flight” is difficult to be avoided
without contradicting the idea of free school choice itself. However, it
seems that ethnic diversity bears a trade-off between achievement and
social life. It should be noted that the effect of having low grades in pri-
mary school can fade away with age, but there can be more long-lasting
behaviours towards school that can be developed during primary school.
For example, a child’s well-being at school can be a good indicator of
how the child will form his idea of going to school. The importance of
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these aspects are confirmed by Gibbons and Silva (2009). Hence, in or-
der to corroborate the idea of the beneficial effects of ethnic diversity
in school, the importance of social versus early academic outcomes for
migrant children should be further investigated.
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The outcome “school well-being” is based on evaluation of pupils (agree/disagree,
5 options) of the following statements:
• I get well along with teachers
• I think I learn interesting things in school
• I find the school annoying
• I feel at home in school
• I feel comfortable with teachers
• I think the pupils of my class are nice
The outcome “school self-confidence” is based on evaluation of pupils
(agree/disagree, 5 options) of the following statements:
• I can learn well
• I am one of the best pupils in the class
• Most of the pupils of the class can learn better than me
• The teacher thinks that I can learn well
• I need little help in the class
The outcome “social integration in the class” is based on evaluation of
pupils (agree/disagree, 5 options) of the following statements:
• Most pupils of the class get along better with each other than with
me
• I have few friends in this class
• I get well along with my classmates
• I am often teased by the other children of my class
• I think is nice to stay with my classmates
• If I ask my classmates for help, there are enough that can do it
The outcome “teacher-pupil relationship” is based on evaluation of pupils
(agree/disagree, 5 options) of the following statements:
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• The student feels at ease with me
• The student finds the school unpleasant
• The student has a good relationship with me
• The student would like to reduce the school
• The students has a difficult contact with me
• The student comes to school unwillingly
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Chapter 3
Promoting scientific faculties:
does it work?
3.1 Introduction
In the last decade, many developed countries have shown a concern about
scientific education. In some cases the absolute number of students en-
rolled in scientific and technological tracks increased, masking an overall
expansion of secondary and tertiary education. The share of students
enrolled in science and technology is, perhaps, a more appropriate indi-
cator of the trend, as it normalizes changes in the student population
and demographic trends. The evolution of the share of enrolments in
scientific and technological studies at secondary and tertiary educational
level has been overall decreasing in most of the OECD countries over
the last twenty years, though the number of students in Engineering and
Computer Science increased . The picture is more serious when consid-
ering traditional scientific disciplines such as Mathematics and Physics
and PhD programs, in which the decline occurred also in absolute terms
(OECD, 2008).
A reversion of this downward trend should be desirable for a vari-
ety of reasons. First, R&D may become more difficult over time and a
small number of scientist engaged in R&D can hinder economic growth
(Segerstrom, 1998). Moreover, investing in studies that “bear” a higher
chance of over-education1 is inefficient. For instance in the Italian con-
text, investing in quantitative fields (including Science) increases not only
the participation to the labour market and the employment probability,
but also early earnings2 (Buonanno and Pozzoli, 2007). Furthermore,
1See for example Frenette (2004).
2However, this results could be due to the relative scarcity of graduated in scientific
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Webbink and Oosterbeek (1997) show that there is a unexploited tech-
nical potential. That is, there are some types of students that do no
choose technical education, but when they do they perform better than
others. For example, female students choose less often technical stud-
ies, but when they do, they perform better than male. In addition, the
choice of the degree (considering that female choose less often scientific
studies than male) can explain 13% and up to 36% of the gender wage
gap (Machin and Puhani, 2005). Thus, more female in science would
translate in a smaller gender gap. After having briefly illustrated the
importance of science, it is natural to wonder what drives the choice of
the field of study.
The existing literature agrees on the importance of expected earnings
in explaining the choice of the field of study. In a simultaneous model of
field and length of studies, Beffy et al. (2007) find that a 10% increase
of expected earnings in a given field results in a significant impact on
the allocation of students between fields. Montmarquette et al. (2002)
define a model in which the utility of choosing major k depends on the
characteristics of the individual and his expected income corresponding
to major k, that in turn depends on his perceived probability of success
in major k, his expected earnings after graduation for major k and the
earnings alternatives. In their model, preferences are an unobserved ran-
dom component and they also assume that expected earnings are always
realized. They find that expected earnings play a crucial role in col-
lege major choice, though the importance of earnings is lower for female
and for non-whites. In another work Boudabart and Montmarquette
(2007) introduce a weight for expected income as a function of student
characteristics, such as family background, and the probability of job-
education skill match. They find a correlation between male choosing
science and a vocation for high income and for the acquisition of skills,
while for female choosing science they do not find such a correlation.
Berger (1988) stresses the importance of the streams of future earnings
versus early income (at the time of the choice) as driving the students’
choice of college majors. Freeman et al. (2008) introduce the role of the
knowledge content of job. That is, the choice to undertake a specific
major may be affected by the importance of the competencies provided
by that major in the labour market, that may vary over years. They
find that women, when choosing majors, are more responsive to this as-
pect, while men are more responsive to changes in the wage return of
the knowledge content in a field. The different behaviour of male and
fields (Ballarino and Bratti, 2006) and to the signal for high ability and flexibility
attached to Italian scientific graduates (Convert, 2005).
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female is a constant feature in the literature about the choice of college
major3, but this difference does not seem to be addressed at the level of
policy design. On the other hand, Arcidiacono (2004) argues that the
large exogenous monetary premiums for attending science (and business
courses) cannot explain the ability sorting across majors, due instead to
differing preferences for majors across abilities.
However, a non-decreasing payoff of science cannot explain why sci-
entific fields of study are chosen less often today than in past years.
We agree with Convert (2005) that this apparently puzzling fact can
be explained by a general (among the developed countries) expansion
and democratization of the education system, where the students more
“adverse” to science or less informed about studying science, like female
and students with low family background, have entered higher education.
At this point, a more general question arises: how can policy affect the
choice of the field of study?
Some governments have attempted to attract more students in scien-
tific tracks. The policy instruments that have been used fall under two
categories: reduction of tuition fees and promotion of science studies.
The first tool merely reduces the direct cost of investments in scientific
education, as it is commonly assumed that the non-monetary costs of
studying science are higher than those of studying, for instance, human-
ities. The second kind of intervention may play a role in the formation
of the expectations about the probability of finding a (proper) job and
about earnings after majoring in science and it may increase the non
pecuniary returns of studying science, by stimulating the interest in sci-
entific subjects. Moreover, promotion activities may help students to
familiarize themselves with scientific subjects and, as a possible conse-
quence, they may upgrade their perception of the probability of success
in science majors.
Italy is not an exception of the general trend of declining majoring in
science. In the next years there will be a generational turnover of high
school teachers and, in particular, new teachers of science are needed.
Moreover, the contribution of the private sector to the founding of re-
search, a crucial aspect for science, is 40% with respect to an Euroepan
average of 53.4% (Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione , 2007). The per-
formance of 15 year-old Italian students in science, reported by the survey
OCSE-PISA 2006, are not conforting. Aware of this situation, in 2005
the Ministry of Education and Research, the National Employers Organi-
zation (Confindustria) and the Universities launched a program to boost
enrolment in scientific bachelors and to increase the number of graduates
3See for example Zafar (2009).
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in science. With respect to the first aim, the content of this policy was
to promote scientific studies to high school students.
This paper analyzes the impact of the sponsoring policy on enrol-
ments in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics and Materials Science4 to see
whether it has been effective and, more in detail, for whom it worked
and in which fields. We match the records of the students enrolled in
the two main public universities of Milan with the records of the sec-
ondary schools that participated to the program. We use an “exposure”
approach to identify the “intention” effect of the treatment. We find that
the ”Progetto Lauree Scientifiche” increased the probability to choose a
scientific bachelor, on average, by about 1.5%. The effect is not limited to
the selected disciplines and there are positive cross effects of treatment’s
subject for Mathematics and Physics. When considering a differential
effect of the policy for male and female, we find that for male students
the policy was even more successfull, with a shift in the probability of
enrolment in science equal to 3.5 percentage points, while for female it
seems the policy had no effect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 dis-
cusses the content and the functioning of the policy. Section 3.3 presents
the available data. Section 3.4 explains the “exposure” approach pro-
posed to evaluate the effect of the policy. Section 3.5 reports the de-
scriptive statistics of our sample. Section 3.6 presents our findings and
Sections 3.7 adds some robustness checks. Finally, Section 3.8 draws
some conclusive remarks.
3.2 The PLS policy
The “Progetto Lauree Scientifiche” (PLS) is a policy launched in 2005
by an agreement between the Ministry of Education and Research, the
National Employers Organization and the National Committee of Sci-
ence and Technological Universities to increase the enrolments and the
number of graduates in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics and Materials
Science. The distinguishing characteristic of this project, with respect
to previous interventions, is the considerable amount of its founding and
its coverage of the national territory: 11 millions euro invested and more
than 30 universities involved5. The program includes different interven-
tions: 4 about the sponsoring of science to students and the training of
teachers, at secondary school level, 3 concern university education, stage
and post-graduate studies, 1 for scholarships and other activities at ter-
4Materials Science is a course of study in chemistry and physics of materials.
5Only two regions were not involved in the program: Valle d’Aosta and Molise.
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tiary level (Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione , 2007). The first block
of interventions aimed at increasing enrolments in scientific bachelors
and was intended for high school students, while the other blocks aimed
at increasing the number of graduates in science and were intended for
university students.
The present analysis focuses on what we think is the most innova-
tive content of this policy: the activities to promote scientific studies to
secondary school students. The project was initially introduced for two
years: 2005 and 2006. The content of this sponsoring policy is summa-
rized by an evocative sentence: “We need to change the idea that Math is
boring, Physics difficult and Chemistry dangerous” (page 10 of Ministero
della Pubblica Istruzione (2007)). The activities to promote scientific
studies to high school students aim, on the one hand, at stimulating the
interest in subjects that are commonly deemed to be boring and, on the
other, they aim at filling the gap between the perception of the professions
one can undertake after these studies and the variety of the applications
they can have (both in terms of the width of labour opportunities and
the social utility of these studies). In practice, the project organized lab
activities stimulating an active participation of students and experiments
to show the links between science and everyday life. A second, but not
minor, pillar upon which the project is focused is the involvement of
secondary school teachers to stimulate the interest of their students in
science, realized through training and support for lab activities provided
by university professors and researchers.
The target of the policy were students of the last three years of the
secondary cycle of education. 50.000 students, 20.000 teachers and 2.000
high schools6 participated to these activities on the entire national terri-
tory (Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione , 2007). The PLS deliberately
intended to attract students according to their interest. The rationale
of the policy was to boost an underlying propensity or ability for scien-
tific studies and not to create it. The explicit aim was to increase the
matriculations in the bachelors of Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics and
Materials Science.
Originally, all secondary schools received an official communication
about the PLS policy, but few of them were actually involved in this
way. In most of the cases the universities that organized these activities
relied on e-mails, personal contacts with teachers and principals and on
a teacher-to-teacher advertising. Once the organizers of the activities
had a reference person in a school, through one or more teachers or
the principal, the participation could occur with one or more classes or
6Schools are counted twice if they participated to two activities.
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with small groups of students, depending on the type of the activity.
The teacher of reference was not necessarily the teacher of the students
involved, as the program was limited to the last three years of the high
school. Furthermore, many activities were mainly targeted to the last
or before last year students of high school and could take place in the
first or the second semester of the school year. From direct interviews
that we made to the organizers of the activities, it often happened that
the decision of a school to participate with the 4th or 5th grade depended
on the collocation of the activity in the first or second semester. In the
second semester many 5th grades were busy to prepare their final exam.
Students could participate in one or more activities, in one or more of the
four subjects. Finally, the program organized a survey of the participants
to assess their evaluation of the activities.
The PLS policy may have affected three aspects regarding the choice
of the field of study. First, practical examples of professions linked with
the every day life may have “corrected” the labour market expectations
related to graduates in science. Second, the proposal of non-standard ac-
tivities may have increased the non-pecuniary returns of studying science.
Finally, the time spent following the PLS activities may have helped stu-
dents to familiarize themselves with scientific subjects and increased stu-
dents’ expectations of success in studying science. While the first aspect
may, according to the literature, affect mostly male students, the second
aspect could be more important for female students.
3.3 Data
We anticipate the section about the data as data availability has con-
strained the empirical strategy. Thus, we explain which data we have
and in the next section, given the data, which strategy we use. We had
access to the data of the students’ enrolments in the two public univer-
sities of Milan: Universita` degli Studi di Milano and Universita` degli
Studi Milano-Bicocca, containing the records of the high school attended
by the student and its address, the year of the enrolment, the year, age
and mark of the final high school diploma, the type of school, gender,
family income bracket and the chosen bachelor. The data cover four
school years: from 2004 to 20077.
A second data-set contains the information of the high schools partic-
ipating to the program, with the address of the school, the subject of the
program in which the school was involved, the year of involvement and
the grades involved or the grade that individual students attended when
7These years correspond to school year 2004/2005 to 2007/2008.
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participating. This dataset corresponds to the questionnaires submitted
to the participants of the PLS after they completed the activities. About
the questionnaires the program defined three cases: for some activities
the questionnaires had to be filled in by individual students, for others
they had to be filled in at the class level, whereas for some activities (es-
pecially for the more general ones, such as the showing of movies about
science, museums’ visits and so on) the program did not ask to fill any
questionnaire. Some information about school participation were miss-
ing. I collected the remaining information through direct contacts with
the professors who organized these activities. I then matched these two
data-set by the address of the secondary school.
It was non possible to link the information about program’s partic-
ipation at the individual level, even for the questionnaires filled by the
students, as the data-set about program’s participation does not contain
and individual identifier. Since the corrections we made on the two data-
sets and the recovering of the missing information were considerably time
consuming, we restricted the analysis to the students enrolled in the two
universities of Milan, having attended a high school in the province of
Milan.
It is worth noticing that among the students having attended the
secondary school in the province of Milan and among those that decide
to continue to study at tertiary level, about 90% enrol at a university
in the same region and among them 93% enrol at a university in the
province of Milan8. However, Milan has several universities: the Catholic
University (15.6%9), the IULM (2.8%), the Bocconi University (7.2%),
the Politecnico (21.4%) and few medical and art institutions (2.2%).
The Catholic University of Milan does not offer bachelors in science,
that are instead offered at a campus located in a city located 85 km
away from Milan10. Similarly, the IULM, the Bocconi University and
the Politecnico do not offer bachelors in science, though the Politecnico
offers “competing” scientific bachelors such as Engineering. The Statale
and Bicocca Universities enrol about 51% of all the students enrolled
in one the universities of Milan, including those who do not provide
courses in science and including students from other provinces, regions
and countries11. Furthermore, the activities of the PLS program were
organized by the two University for which we have the data. It might be
8See www.anagrafe.miur.it.
9The total is the overall number of students enrolled in one of the universi-
ties of Milan, including students from other provinces, regions and countries. See
www.sistemauni.it.
10Brescia
11See www.sistemauni.it.
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that the policy pushed some students to undertake a scientific bachelor
at a university for which we do not have the data, for instance at the
University of Pavia. For the facts listed above we think that the two
public universities of Milan constitute a natural outcome for most of the
students for which the policy could have had an effect. In any case, this
aspect should not invalidate our analysis, at the most it could make it
weaker.
The final dataset contains the records of students coming from 320
different secondary schools, out of which 56 were involved in the program.
The participating schools sent 14172 students from 2004 to 2007. From
this matched sample I exclude the (few) schools that do not have a stable
number of students enrolled in the two universities over the four year
period 2004-2007. I also drop the students with a gap year between the
diploma and the first year of matriculation. The final sample includes
6333 observations for post-policy years (2006 and 2007). The schools can
have participated to the PLS in 2005 and/or 2006, with the 5th or the 4th
grade. In these schools 46% of the students were exposed to the activities
organized by the PLS program since its inception, corresponding to 3371
individuals for the school year 2006 and 2007.
From the data about project’s participation for which the number of
participants is available12, we know that, approximately, an average of 16
students participated for each high school’s cohort. We also know that
in our final data about university’s enrolments, each high school (of the
province of Milan) sent, on average, 64 students (living in the province
of Milan) per year. If all the participants to the PLS enroled in the
two public universities of Milan, then 25% of the “exposed” cohorts were
actually treated13.
3.4 Empirical strategy
The aim of the analysis is to estimate the effect of the PLS advertising
policy on the enrolment of students in the targeted scientific bachelors.
As this policy was not designed to be a randomized experiment, the
effect of the participation to the PLS may be confounded by several
factors. First, the schools involved may be the schools that better prepare
students for scientific faculties. Second, the students who participated
to the program could be the students most interested in science. Third,
12The number of participants is not available for all the PLS activities and, in any
case, for the individual questionnaires it just corresponds to the number of participants
who actually answered to the questionnaire.
13However, we do not know who they are.
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the classes that participated can have, for instance, better teachers of
scientific subjects. Last, a school may have participated with some classes
of the 4th grade cohort because there were not similar students in the 5th
grade cohort.
In order to avoid the confounding effect of schools’ self-selection, we
only consider the secondary schools involved in the sponsoring policy,
where we can find both the students who participated to the policy and
the students who did not. The results are limited to the effect of the
policy for the schools that chose to participate. While to avoid the con-
founding effect of students’ and classes’ self-selection and, also, for the
constraints imposed by the data14, we adopt an “exposure” approach15.
That is, we assign the treatment to the whole cohort of a school where one
or more classes or some students of the same cohort were involved in the
program. In this way the treatment effect is comparable to an intention
to treat effect. Usually, the intention to treat effect is used in randomized
trials when non compliance may be non random16. In this case we use
the intention to treat because actual treatment is likely endogenous and,
however, we do not have information on actual participants. If we had
information on actual participant we could have only used it to estimate
an upper bound of the treatment. In order to be eligible for the treat-
ment the student should have been in school S in grade g in year t. The
actual treatment effect corresponds to the treatment coefficient divided
by the proportion of students for each cohort in each school that actually
participated in the program. The intention to treat coefficient is a lower
bound of the actual treatment effect.
The identification of the treatment effect together with school-specific
effects and a time trend is allowed by the within school year and/or grade
variation of the exposure to the treatment. The causal interpretation of
the treatment effect relies on the assumption that cohorts within a school
have the same unobservable and the only observable difference is having
been exposed to the policy or not. We partially relax this assumption in
Section 3.7.
The basic idea of this approach is that the cohort’s composition of
students and teachers within a school should be more stable and less
selective than the within school class’ variation or the within class stu-
dents’ variation, in terms of motivation toward science. For example,
14We cannot link the (in any case, incomplete) individual data about PLS’ partic-
ipation to the university administrative data.
15The “exposure” approach is generally used when a given policy has an effect
spread over a certain subpopulation, identified, for instance, by the date and region
of birth. For an application see Bratti et al. (2008) and Oppedisano (2008).
16See for example Angrist and Lavy (2002).
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science’s teachers can teach in more cohorts in the same school and the
potential manipulation of students allocation may occur when forming
classes and not for the cohorts, that are determined by the age of the
students. However, it could still be possible that a cohort in the same
school is systematically different from another cohort in the same school
and that this difference drives the participation (of a portion of these
cohorts) into the program. The resulting model is:
y ∗ics |(U = 1) = α+ βCc + γSs + ξXics + δtreatcs + εics (3.1)
yics =
{
1 if y∗ics > 0
0 if y∗ics ≤ 0
ε ∼ (0, pi2/3)
where y∗ics is the latent propensity to attend a scientific faculty of
the ith student in the cth cohort in the sth school, Cc is a dummy for
the cohort to capture the trend, Ss is the pre-policy rate of enrolment
in scientific bachelor for each school, X is a vector of students’ char-
acteristics (gender, final grade of diploma, having repeated one or two
grades during high school, family income bracket). The variable treatcs
is defined as belonging to a high school’s cohort in which some classes
or some students participated to one or more activities organized by the
PLS. These students are not necessarily actual participants but, among
them, some actually participated. Thus, the coefficient δ is an intention
to treat effect and the average treatment effect for the treated in the
participating schools.
Just to give an example, let’s say that school B was involved in the
project in 2005 with one class in the 4th grade cohort. A student in the
4th grade in 2005 can enrol at the university in 2007. We define as treated
all the students from that cohort of school B. If school C participated
to the program in 2006 with some students of the 4th grade, school C
is included in the analysis and its students enrolled at the university in
year 2006 and 2007 are included in the control group. Indeed, “exposed”
students of school C can enrol at the university at the earliest in 2008,
but our data include only enrolments in 2006 and 2007. The Table below
illustrates the mechanism of the treatment’s assignment:
year and class PLS → year enrol. school A school B school C
2005 V → 2006 T C C
2005 IV (2006 V) → 2007 C T C
2006 IV → 2008 C C T
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As we consider only the participating schools and we do not assign
the treatment at the individual or class level, we do not have to deal
with possible unobservable and confounding factors such as ηs, υi and
νg, respectively at school, individual and class level. The outcome yics
is a binary variable for whether or not the student attends a bachelor
in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics or Materials Sciences. We have to
condition on U (equal to one if the student is enrolled at the university)
as we do not have data about the students of the sth high school that do
not enrol at the university. Hence, with this model we cannot disentangle
the effect of the treatment on the probability to go to the university to
follow a scientific track from the effect on the probability to choose a
scientific track, once chosen to go to the university (independently from
the policy). The coefficient δ includes both mechanisms. Finally, since
the error terms may be correlated within school and cohort and the
coefficient of interest is defined at this level, we cluster by school and
cohort to capture common unobservable shocks to students in the same
school and cohort. We allow for an unrestricted correlation structure.
3.5 Descriptive statistics
Figure 3.1 shows the trend of the share of the enrolments at the two
universities of Milan in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics and Materials
Sciences from 2004 to 2007, separately for the schools participating to the
PLS and those who did not. The vertical line corresponds to the year in
which the policy may have started to have an effect on these enrolments.
The positive change in the trend at the point the policy was introduced
for the group of the schools involved is clearcut, especially in the first
year of its implementation.
Figure 3.2 shows the same picture, but with the absolute number of
the enrolments in the four sciences rather than the share on the total
number of enrolments. The difference in the trends for the two groups of
schools is slightly more pronounced than in Figure 3.1. The participating
schools had already a larger share and number of students enrolled in
science before the policy was introduced, but the steep increase after
2005 is considerable. In the first year after the introduction of the policy
the effect seems to be driven by Physics, while in the second year by
Chemistry. Indeed, in 2006 there are 13% of students that were exposed
to a treatment in Physics, while only 6% the following year. The opposite
is true for Chemistry: 5% of treated in 2006 and 42% in 2007.
Figure 3.3 shows the trend in science’s enrolments for male and fe-
male, in non participating and participating schools. If for female the
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Figure 3.1: Trend of the share of enrolments in science, by school partic-
ipation to PLS
Figure 3.2: Trend of the number of enrolments in science, by school
participation to PLS
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increase in enrolments for the participating schools seems to happen only
in the first year after the introduction of the policy, for male the increase
is notable and constant over the following two years. Figure 3.4 shows
the difference between the share of students immatriculated in science
between the cohorts exposed and not exposed to the treatment, only for
the participating schools. Figure 3.4 seems to confirm that the gain from
being exposed to the policy is higher for male than for female.
Figure 3.3: Trend of the number of enrolments in science, by school
participation and gender
Table 3.1 and 3.2 report the descriptive statistics of the sample of
participating schools, by treatment status. Table 3.1 reports mean values
using students as unit of measurement, while Table 3.2 is calculated using
cohorts as unit of measurement. When we assign equal weight to each
cohort, the only significant difference between treated and controls is
the year of enrolment. On the other hand, if we assign a weight to
the cohorts proportional to their number of students we find that the
treated and control students differ in the pre-policy share of enrolments
in science and in the share of male of the high school of provenience.
However, the share of male is not a pre-treatment variable. Thus, the
descriptive characteristics reported in Table 3.1 and 3.2 do not seem to
seriously invalidate our cohort approach, where we would basically like
to have the treated and non treated cohorts as similar as possible.
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Figure 3.4: Gap in the share of enrolments in science between treated
and control group, by gender
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics (with students as unit of observation)
control group treated group difference
Science 0.080 0.105 -0.025**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Pre-policy share science 0.052 0.057 -0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Enrolment 2007 0.346 0.671 -0.325**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012)
Male 0.434 0.487 -0.053**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Mark diploma 0.031 -0.012 0.042
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025)
Fail 0.136 0.147 -0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
N 3102 3231 6333
3.6 Empirical findings
Table 3.3 reports the estimation of equation 3.1. In order to interpret the
results in terms of probabilities we also report the corresponding marginal
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics (with cohorts as unit of observation)
control cohorts treated cohorts difference
Science 0.080 0.106 -0.026
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015)
Pre-policy share science 0.058 0.057 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Enrolment 2007 0.348 0.691 -0.343**
(0.058) (0.063) (0.086)
Male 0.524 0.550 -0.027
(0.033) (0.031) (0.046)
Mark diploma -0.044 -0.014 0.030
(0.040) (0.049) (0.063)
Fail 0.172 0.171 -0.000
(0.019) (0.015) (0.025)
N 69 55 124
effects. The attended high school’s pre-policy share of students enrolled
in a scientific track is the major determinant of the choice of a scientific
bachelor. Male students are 8% more likely to choose a scientific track
and the higher the mark of the diploma, the higher this chance. On the
other side, students who failed a grade during secondary school are less
likely to choose science at the university. There is no significant trend in
the enrolment of science between 2006 and 2007, that we can interpret as
a stable (perceived) labour market rewards for choosing a scientific track.
Introducing a control for family income does not change the results. The
possibility to participate to the PLS project significantly increases by
1.4% the probability to enrol in scientific faculties. By using a liner
probability model the effect raises to 1.9%. Thus, for the cohorts who
had the chance to participate, the treatment shifts upward the probability
to enrol in science. We gather all four scientific bachelors in one dummy
for science studies or “other studies”. We have to remember that only
a small fraction of the cohorts defined as treated have been actually
treated. For this reason we expect the actual (individual) effect of the
PLS policy to be higher than that found here.
As the figures reported in this paper suggest, it is worthwhile to
investigate whether the effect of the treatment is the same for male and
female. By calculating a proper interaction effect between treatment and
gender17, we indeed find that the positive effect of the policy is driven
17In a non linear model framework, this interaction effect corresponds to the cross
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Table 3.3: Main effect of the participation to the PLS program
Logit Marginal effects OLS
Pre-policy share science 9.4269** 0.5536** 0.7770**
(1.5574) (0.0920) (0.1334)
Enrolment 2007 -0.0144 -0.0008 0.0016
(0.1244) (0.0073) (0.0092)
Male 1.2758** 0.0816** 0.0981**
(0.0939) (0.0076) (0.0094)
Mark diploma 0.7687** 0.0451** 0.0641**
(0.0548) (0.0031) (0.0059)
Failure -0.4173* -0.0216* -0.0230*
(0.2071) (0.0096) (0.0101)
Treatment 0.2450* 0.0144* 0.0186*
(0.1235) (0.0073) (0.0092)
N 6333 6333 6333
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered by school
and cohort. Marginal effects calculated at mean values.
by male students. Th effect of treatment for male is 3.5% higher than
for female with a z-value of 2.1 and this effect dominates for most of the
values of the other control variables. Figure 5 shows this result.
The treatment includes activities in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics
or Materials Sciences. We expect an effect of the subject-specific treat-
ment on the choice of the same subject as the activity attended, but we
do not exclude that it can have an effect on the other three scientific
subjects. Table 3.4 shows the cross treatment effect for each of the four
scientific subjects. We restrict the analysis to the students who partic-
ipated in the activities in only one subject, to avoid the correlation be-
tween participations in different subject-specific activities. As expected,
the effect are found on the diagonal. However, we cannot give a causal
interpretation of these coefficients, as it can be that cohorts more inclined
towards one subject chose to participate (even the small fraction) to the
activities in that specific subject. Interestingly, there are cross effects for
Mathematics and Physics. Participating in activities about Physics has
a positive effect on choosing Mathematics and viceversa.
derivative of the bachelor choice equation with respect to gender and treatment and
not to the single derivative with respect to the interaction gender and treatment. For
the calculation we used the Stata command inteff (Ai and Norton, 2003).
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Figure 3.5: PLS treatment effect heterogenous by gender
Table 3.4: Cross subject-specific treatment effects on each subject
Chemistry Physics Math Mat Sc
Chemistry treatment 0.4874† -0.3253 0.0166 0.2392
(0.2767) (0.4579) (0.2848) (0.3994)
Physics treatment -0.0632 0.5620* 1.1245** -1.2700
(0.2617) (0.2585) (0.2728) (0.9217)
Mathematics treatment -0.1178 0.5449* 0.6292* -0.5599
(0.2105) (0.2592) (0.2522) (0.7159)
Materials Sc. treatment -0.1281 0.0044 -0.0837 0.8906*
(0.3458) (0.2440) (0.3626) (0.3635)
N 5697 5697 5697 5697
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Control variables for each estimation not
reported in the table are as in Table 3.3. Standard errors are clustered by school and
cohort.
In addition, the policy was intended to promote the four mentioned
scientific subjects, but there can have been supplementary effects. First,
if the policy diverted potential students from other scientific fields not
included in the policy’s target, it could not be considered as a full success.
As already mentioned, the policy can act in two ways: by redistribut-
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ing students across faculties and by increasing the number of students
that choose to purse their studies at the university to follow a scientific
track. The first mechanism can, in turn, works by redistributing stu-
dents from overcrowded tracks or from other scientific and reasonably
non rival tracks, according to the philosophy of the policy. Last, the
policy can have a positive effect on other bachelors. Table 3.5 shows that
the policy does not appear to have diverted students from other scien-
tific and quantitative bachelors. Moreover, there is a strong positive and
significant effect of the treatment on Pharmacy, reasonably due to the
fact that this faculty also includes a course of study in Chemistry and
Pharmaceutical Technologies.
Table 3.5: PLS treatment effect on other bachelors
treatment
Biotechnology 0.0047
(0.1621)
Biology 0.1471
(0.1348)
Pharmacy 0.3393*
(0.1341)
Environmental Sciences -0.2718
(0.4076)
Geology 0.5024
(0.3405)
Economics -0.2000
(0.1706)
Medicine 0.2028
(0.2554)
Statistics -0.2987
(0.3143)
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered by school
and cohort.
This result, together with the increase in the absolute number of
male enrolments from the participating schools, might point in favor of
the mechanism of the policy as boosting students to go to the university
in order to attend a bachelor in science.
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3.7 Robustness checks
The treated and untreated groups differ in some (omitted) characteristics
that could bias the result about project’s participation. In fact, the co-
hort’s composition in each school may reflect the learning environment of
the students of our sample, through peers’ effect or as a result of common
shocks as in a case where teachers are assigned to cohorts according to the
characteristics of the students. In other words, the difference in some ob-
servable characteristics between treated and untreated cohorts can have
an effect itself on the choice of scientific bachelors and not merely through
the treatment status. In order to check this possibility we perform an
estimation including controls for cohort’s average characteristics in each
school18. Results are reported in the first column of Table 3.6. Column
2 reports the marginal effects. Cohort’s average characteristics do play a
role in the choice of college major, especially the share of grade repeaters
and the proportion of male. Conditional on the average characteristics,
the treatment coefficient is slightly reduced to 1.3% as well as the corre-
sponding standard error. Unfortunately, we do not have pre-treatment
characteristics. Therefore, the selection of cohorts into treatment may
have not been based on these characteristics and they could not represent
the actual learning environment of the student. They could be, instead,
an effect of the treatment on university’s enrolment. In particular, we
cannot exclude that project’s participation had an effect on male univer-
sity’s enrolment. In column 3 and 4 of Table 3.6 we report the results
by replacing the share of male for the school/cohort combination that
the student belongs to with the average share of male in the same school
for the two cohorts preeceding the introduction of the policy. With this
latter specification the treatment coefficient is confirmed to increase by
around 1.4-1.5% the probability to choose a scientific bachelor, with a
confidence level within 5%.
As explained in Section 3.2 the PLS policy provided also training
courses for secondary school teachers. We know the year of participa-
tion, the school of the teachers involved and that they were teachers of
the last three grades of the high school. We cannot identify the effect of
teacher training as all cohorts of students in our data, coming from the
schools where these teachers were working would be defined as treated.
In other words, teacher training is introduced as a school level control.
As a robustness check we insert in our specification a control for teacher
training for the students that could have had these teachers. If we cannot
18Average characteristics are calculated excluding the ith observation for each ob-
servation.
103
Chapter 3. Promoting scientific faculties: does it work?
Table 3.6: Estimation with cohort’s average characteristics
Logit Mfx Logit Mfx
Pre-policy share science 7.4287** 0.4242** 7.9608** 0.4579**
(1.6249) (0.0926) (1.6281) (0.0928)
Enrolment 2007 -0.0137 -0.0008 -0.0135 -0.0008
(0.1090) (0.0062) (0.1107) (0.0064)
Male 1.2142** 0.0751** 1.2234** 0.0763**
(0.1032) (0.0074) (0.1047) (0.0076)
Mark diploma 0.7706** 0.0440** 0.7705** 0.0443**
(0.0549) (0.0029) (0.0547) (0.0029)
Fail -0.3845 -0.0195* -0.3838 -0.0196*
(0.2078) (0.0095) (0.2075) (0.0096)
Cohort’s share male 1.3889** 0.0793**
(0.3310) (0.0185)
Cohort’s share male (pre) 1.1639** 0.0669**
(0.3129) (0.0181)
Cohort’s av mark diploma 0.1023 0.0058 0.0978 0.0056
(0.2570) (0.0147) (0.2656) (0.0153)
Cohort’s share fail -3.0149** -0.1722** -2.7224** -0.1566**
(0.7445) (0.0414) (0.6889) (0.0397)
Treatment 0.2244* 0.0128* 0.2539* 0.0146*
(0.1102) (0.0063) (0.1123) (0.0065)
N 6333 6333 6333 6333
Legend: † p<0.10 ∗ p<0.05 ∗∗ p<0.01. Standard errors are clustered by school
and cohort. Marginal effects in columns 2 and 4 are calculated at mean values.
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interpret the effect of teacher training on student enrolment in science,
the omission of this variable could distort our results. For instance, if
the students that are classified in the control group are the students of
the teachers that received the training, the coefficient of the treatment
for the students’ activities could be underestimated. This more precise
specification strengthens our results: conditional on teachers’ training,
the treatment increases by 1.5% the probability to choose a scientific
bachelor, with a confidence level of 4.4% (regression not reported).
3.8 Final remarks
The intuition of the PLS policy seems right: policy interventions should
be made before the choice of the field is made by the students. Contrary
to interventions such as the reduction of tuition fees in science that, in
Italy for example, act ex-post. The policy succeeded in increasing en-
rolments in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics, Materials Sciences and,
unintentionally, in Pharmacy. Participating in activities in one subject
is correlated with the probability of enrolling in a bachelor in that sub-
ject but not exclusively, as in the case of the students participating in
the activities of Physics and Mathematics. For these subjects, the PLS
project seems to boost a general attitude towards a scientific approach,
rather than a specific interest in the selected disciplines.
Nonetheless, a more accurate insight into the effect of the policy leads
to a somehow different conclusion. The policy was very effective for male
students, but there seems to be no effect for female students. Having
participating to the treatment raises the probability to enrol in a scientific
track by 3.5 percentage points for male with respect to female and this
result holds for most of the values of the other characteristics of the
student. If we follow the existing literature on the choice of college major,
as depending on expected income, being a function of the probability to
find a (proper) job and of expected earnings, and on a non-pecuniary
utility of studying science, we believe that the PLS policy was more
effective in tackling the first issue. Indeed, if male react more than female
to changes in expected income and treated male benefit the most from the
policy, we can imagine that these activities helped students in correcting
their labour market expectations for graduating in science.
Overall, our results are robust to different specifications and poorly
sensitive to controls for additional factors such as cohorts’ average char-
acteristics and teacher training activities. The effect of the treatment
on the probability to choose a scientific bachelor ranges from 1.3% to
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1.8%. It is worthwhile noticing that the effect that we identify with the
cohort approach is an intention to treat effect. Consequently, we expect
the actual (individual) effect of participating to the PLS activities to
be somehow higher and the higher, the lower the proportion of students
actually treated on the size of the same cohort enrolled at the univer-
sity. For instance, if this proportion were 20% of the cohorts classified as
treated, the actual policy effect could go up to 17.5% for male. From the
analysis we can also deduce that the policy worked through pushing stu-
dents that would have not chosen to pursue their studies at the university
to follow a scientific track, rather than by redistributing students across
bachelors. Indeed, we do not find a negative effect of the PLS policy on
the enrolments in other bachelors and the data show an increase in the
absolute number of the students of science.
The overall cost of the 7 projects organized by the universities of
Milan (2 for Chemistry, 2 for Physics, 2 for Mathematics and 1 for Ma-
terials Science) was 717838 euro, including the activities to train high
school teachers. A 1.5% effect of the policy19 for our sample of treated
schools/cohorts including 3371 students means that 51 students chose a
scientific bachelor thanks to the policy. Thus, the (maximum) cost to
have one student more studying science is about 14000 euro20. An ex-
tension of this research could be to estimate the benefit of having one
student more studying science.
The limitation of our study is the short sight of our evaluation, due
to the fact that the “Progetto Lauree Scientifiche” is a policy introduced
very recently. We do not know if what we identify as a success will be-
come a later drop-out from science bachelors and/or if it translates in a
lower academic performance of the students boosted to study science.
It would be interesting to compare these findings with other studies on
the effect of policies sponsoring scientific majors, especially for policies
designed to be a randomized experiment. Our results, supported by the
existing literature, would suggest to pay more attention to gender differ-
ences in the choice of college major when designing policies to sponsor
scientific studies.
19We are just considering the effect of the sponsoring activities for high school
students and not the effect of teacher training (as we do not know the magnitude of
this effect).
20This per capita estimation is valid only if the effect of teacher training on the stu-
dents’ choice of scientific bachelor is zero, otherwise this amount is an overestimation
of the costs.
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